= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
Pfft comments on Voting is like donating thousands of dollars to charity - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Loading…= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
Powered by Reddit
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (210)
If one Virginia voter does an expected 1/(3.5 million)*($7 trillion) = $2 million good by voting for candidate X, then there is another Virginia voter that does an expected $2 million of damage by voting for candidate Y. It seems that either
Roughly half of the population is misinformed about which alternative is objectively better. In that case, how do I justify a belief that I have a greater than 50% chance of being right, when everyone else has access to the same information?
There are real differences in values, and by my vote I direct the outcome towards my preference instead of the other Virginia voter's. In that case, sure I want to vote, but should we really call it altruism?
Well, you can replace "which alternative is objectively better" with any other belief on which opinions differ and the same argument applies.
"any other belief"
This invites us to look at why beliefs differ. First we have to acknowledge that we are talking about differences between people with comparable levels of expertise, so this isn't the same as the disagreements that exist between experts and novices.
For elections, I think we can say that people disagree in large part because the situation is incredibly complicated. It it hard to know how government policies will affect human welfare, and it is hard to know how elected officials will shape government policy.
The only interesting factor that I can think of is differences in our scope of altruism -- one voter may feel altruistic towards their city, while another focuses on the nation, and a third focuses on all of humanity.
"First we have to acknowledge that we are talking about differences between people with comparable levels of expertise"
The assertion that the vast majority of voters have done a sizeable amount of research, rather than simply voting "along party lines" or "like mom always did" or "because dad was overcontrolling and I'm not going to support HIS party" strikes me as the sort of assertion that would require quite a lot of evidence.
One can reasonably conclude that in politics, as with math, the "average person" is ignorant and their opinion is not based on any sort of expertise.
"One can reasonably conclude that in politics, as with math, the "average person" is ignorant and their opinion is not based on any sort of expertise."
Even if you limit the population to those who are well informed, that population is still rather evenly split and so his points still hold.
On some issues, probably. On others, you have the well-informed, educated, cares-about-facts types versus the religious fanatics who want to push their religious agenda, or their personal agenda, or support pork-barrel funding of pet projects, or want to waste extravagant amounts on feel-good charity that accomplishes nothing in the end.
I don't think either political party in the US has a monopoly on educated - it's easier for me to demonize and strawman Republicans since I was raised Democratic. Apologies if my examples thus seem biased in that direction.
So, yes, sometimes, it's clear my opponent has a genuine, reasoned stance. Sometimes, it's equally clear that they don't. It's important to be aware that sometimes the opposing side doesn't have any rational objections because they're wrong.
How are you measuring 'objectively better'?
Roughly half the population is paperclip maximizers.
That situation is alternative 2.
Non-meta calculations, like usual. If someone else thinks the indefinite integral of x^2 is 3x^3, I don't say "well, if we have the same information, I must have a 50% chance of being wrong." Instead, I check the result using boring, ordinary math, and go "nope, looks like it's x^3 / 3."
Yes.
I agree with your approach to solving disagreements about integrals. I do not see how it applies to politics, where disagreements are far more diverse, including factual, moral, and unconscious conflicts.
Well, people do differ in values, but it seems like more often some people are just wrong. Viz: global warming as a factual disagreement.
So what do you do if half the population disagrees with you about a factual issue? (Copy and paste time!) I don't say 'well, if we have the same information, I must have a 50% chance of being wrong.' Instead, I check the result using boring, ordinary scholarship, and go 'nope, looks like there's a mechanism for CO2 to cause the atmosphere to warm up.'
Note that a key part of this process is that if you're wrong, you should notice sometimes - there's no "checking" otherwise, just pretend-checking. So that's a good skill to work on.
That some people are "just wrong" is not at issue. Even mistaken people agree that some people are wrong. (They just think it's the right-thinking folks who are in error.)
Of course you don't. If half the population disagrees with you about an issue, you should interpret that as evidence that you are incorrect. How strong the evidence is, depends on how likely they are to possess information you don't, to be misled by things you've prepared yourself for, etc.
Agreed. I guess what makes checking the math work in the integral case is just that the better you are at checking the arguments, the less you have to worry about what other people think.
In other words, people who are convinced by this argument are more likely than the average person to be correct about the objectively better candidate it convinces them to vote for?
"Voting is irrational unless you are arrogant?"
You can still call it altruism, and it can be helpful to distinguish "selfishness" in the sense usually considered for decision problems from "altruism". The example I like to propose for illustration is the Codependent Prisoner's Dillema, which has Romeo and Juliet as the prisoners who are each obsessed with the other's wellbeing and the jailers use this fact when manipulating them. So when Romeo is "selfishly maximising his own preferences" and picking the option that puts him away for 10 years but lets Juliet go free he is also being "altruistic" towards Juliet while brutally ignoring her preference that she be the one who gets to be the martyr.