wdmacaskill comments on Giving What We Can, 80,000 Hours, and Meta-Charity - Less Wrong

44 Post author: wdmacaskill 15 November 2012 08:34PM

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Comment author: wdmacaskill 10 November 2012 11:49:58PM 5 points [-]

In order to get exceptional value for money you need to (correctly) believe that you are smarter than the big donors - >otherwise they'd already have funded whatever you're planning on funding to the point where the returns diminish to the >same level as everything else.

That's if you think that the big funders are rational and have similar goals as you. I think assuming they are rational is pretty close to the truth (though I'm not sure: charity doesn't have the same feedback mechanisms as business, because if you get punished you don't get punished in the same way). beoShaffer suggests that they just have different goals - they are aiming to make themselves look good, rather than do good. I think that could explain a lot of cases, but not all - e.g. it just doesn't seem plausible to me for the Gates Foundation.

So I ask myself: why doesn't Gates spend much more money on increasing revenue to good causes, through advertising etc? One answer is that he does spend such money: the Giving Pledge must be the most successful meta-charity ever. Another is that charities are restricted in how they can act by cultural norms. E.g. if they spent loads of money on advertising, then their reputation would take a big enough hit to outweigh the benefits through increased revenue.

Comment author: beoShaffer 11 November 2012 12:32:26AM 2 points [-]

beoShaffer suggests that they just have different goals - they are aiming to make themselves look good, rather than do good.

Agree with the part before the dash, have a subtle but important correction to the second part. While the explicit desire to look good certainly can play a role, I think it is as or more common for giving to have a different proximate cause, but to still approximate efficient signaling (rather than efficient helping) because the underlying intuitions evolved for signaling purposes.

Comment author: Strange7 11 November 2012 07:40:58PM 0 points [-]

The best way to look good to, say, exceptionally smart people and distant-future historians, is to act in almost exactly the way a genuinely good person would act.