First, that's not a utility function; see the edited version of my last comment. We have a tendency around here to use "utility function" as if it describes fundamental moral impulses, but I'd imagine that's because we like to talk about AIs, for whom such a function can be written explicitly and for whom consistency between agents is no trouble. Neither of those conditions holds true for our messy meat brains.

Fair enough. What term would you prefer? I'll use "morality" for now.

Pathology gives the idea a lot of trouble, but even if you ignore that there's simply not enough evidence to declare that it's consistent enough to define as a single function describing the foundational moral sentiments of all normal people.

Quite the opposite, we can see that our morality exists unchanged regardless of beliefs by the fact that there are people who actually do have different moralities. As a vegetarian, I can tell you that a lot of people who believe eating meat is OK do so because they are mistaken about the environment; remove the mistake (by showing them how horrible conditions are in factory farms, for example) and they will see that eating meat is wrong (or at least that factory farming is wrong.) If they genuinely didn't value the pain of animals, say, this would fail. No amount of argument will persuade Clippy that killing people is wrong.