Is there something that it is like to be you?
I'm not sure this question is any better formed. "What it is like to be an X" doesn't seem to have any coherent meaning when one presses people about what they actually are talking about.
If anything, the philosophical consensus is that qualia is important.
Taking qualia seriously as a question is a distinct claim than qualia actually having anything substantial to do with consciousness. I'm not sure of specific acceptance levels of qualia, but the fact is that a majority of philosophers either accept physicalism or lean towards it. So I'm not sure how to reconcile that with your claim.
Yes, behaviorism is a very attractive solution. But presumably what people want is a living conscious artificial mind and not a useful house maid in robot form. I can get that functionality right now.
On the contrary, most people don't care whether it is conscious in some deep philosophical sense. In fact, having functional AI that are completely not conscious have certain advantages- such as being less of an ethical problem in sending them to be destroyed (say as robot soldiers, or as probes to other planets). Moreover, the primary worry discussed on LW as far as AI is concerned is that the AI will bootstrap itself in a way that results in a very unpleasant bad singularity. Whether the AI is truly conscious or not has nothing to do with that worry.
Wikipedia? Really?
Yes, for many purposes Wikipedia is quite useful and reasonably reliable as a source. In many fields (math and chemistry for example) articles have been written by actual experts in the fields.
Did you even bother to read the page or are you just pointing to something on wikipedia and believing that constitutes an argument?
My primary intent for the link was for its use in the introduction where it uses the fairly standard notion that "that psychology should concern itself with the observable behavior of people and animals, not with unobservable events that take place in their minds." It is incidentally useful to understand behaviorism in most senses of the term went away not due to arguments about things like qualia, but rather that advances in neuroscience and related areas allowed us to get much more direct access to what was going on inside. At some level, psychology is still controlled by behaviorism if one interprets that to include brain activity as behavior.
And yes, I am familiar with behaviorism in the sense that is discussed in that section. But it still isn't an attempt to explain consciousness. It is essentially an argument that psychology doesn't need to explain consciousness. These aren't the same thing.
"If it is raining, Mr. Smith will use his umbrella. It is raining, therefore Mr. Smith will use his umbrella." Is this a valid deduction? No, it isn't because consciousness is not behavior only.
So I don't follow you at all here, and it doesn't even look like there's any argument you've made here other than just some sort of conclusion. But I don't see where in the notion of "deduction" consciousness comes in. Are you using some non-standard definition of "use" or of "umbrella"?
If you are a fan of Doctor Who, is the Teselecta conscious? Is there something that it is like to be the Teselecta? My answer is no, there is nothing it is like to be a robot piloted by miniature people emulating the behavior of a real conscious person.
Don't be a blockhead. ;)
So, on LW there's a general expectation of civility, and I suspect that that general expectation doesn't go away when one punctuates with a winky-emoticon.
"On the contrary, most people don't care whether it is conscious in some deep philosophical sense."
Do you mean that people don't care if they are philosophical zombies or not? I think they care very much. I also think that you're eliding the point a bit by using "deep" as a way to hand wave the problem away. The problem of consciousness is not some arcane issue that only matters to philosophers in their ivory towers. It is difficult. It is unsolved. And... and this is important. it is a very large problem, so large that we should not sp...
The new paper by Stuart Armstrong (FHI) and Kaj Sotala (SI) has now been published (PDF) as part of the Beyond AI conference proceedings. Some of these results were previously discussed here. The original predictions data are available here.
Abstract: