Multiheaded comments on A Parable On Obsolete Ideologies - Less Wrong
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Well, sure, but the ideological stance is "You should care about rationality." I should think that that's one of the most general and least objectionable ideologies there is.
But I do care, and I no longer want to be protected from the actual answer. When I say that I speak from experience, it's really true. There's a reason that this issue has me banging out dramatic, gushy, italics-laden paragraphs on the terrible but necessary and righteous burden of relinquishing your cherished beliefs---unlike in the case of, say, theism, in which I'm more inclined to just say, "Yeah, so there's no God; get over it"--although I should probably be more sympathetic.
So, why does it matter? Why can't we just treat the issue with benign neglect, think of ourselves as strictly as individuals, and treat other people strictly as individuals? It is such a beautiful ideal--that my works and words should be taken to reflect only on myself alone, and that the words and works of other people born to a similar form should not be taken to reflect on me. It's a beautiful ideal, and it seems like it should be possible to swear our loyalty to the general spirit of this ideal, while still recognizing that---
In this world, it's not that simple. In a state of incomplete information (and it is not all clear to me what it would even mean to have complete information), you have to make probabilistic inferences based on what evidence you do have, and to the extent that there are systematic patterns of cognitive sex and race differences, people are going to update their opinions of others based on sex and race. You can profess that you're not interested in these questions, that you don't know---but just the same, when you see someone acting against type, you're probably going to notice this as unusual, even if you don't explicitly mention it to yourself.
There are those who argue--as I used to argue--that this business about incomplete information, while technically true, is irrelevant for practical purposes, that it's easy to acquire specific about an individual, which screens off any prior information based on sex and race. And of course it's true, and a good point, and an important point to bear in mind, especially for someone who comes to this issue with antiegalitarian biases, rather than the egalitarian biases that I did. But for someone with initial egalitarian biases, it's important not to use it---as I think I used to use it---as some kind of point scored for the individualist/egalitarian side. Complex empirical questions do not have sides. And to the extent that this is not an empirical issue; to the extent that it's about morality---then there are no points to score.
It gets worse---you don't even have anywhere near complete information about yourself. People form egregiously false beliefs about themselves all the time. If you're not ridiculously careful, it's easy to spend your entire life believing that you have an immortal soul, or free will, or that the fate of the light cone depends solely on you and your genius AI project. So information about human nature in general can be useful even on a personal level: it can give you information about yourself that you would never have gotten from mere introspection and naive observation. I know from my readings that if I'm male, I'm more likely to have a heart attack and less likely to get breast cancer than would be the case if I were female, whereas this would not at all be obvious if I didn't read. Why should this be true of physiology, but not psychology? If it turns out that women and men have different brain designs, and I don't have particularly strong evidence that I'm a extreme genetic or developmental anomaly, then I should update my beliefs about myself based on this information, even if it isn't at all obvious from the inside, and even though the fact may offend me and make me want to cry. For someone with a lot of scientific literacy but not as much rationality skill, the inside view is seductive. It's tempting to cry out, "Sure, maybe ordinary men are such-and-this, and normal women are such-and-that, but not me; I'm different, I'm special, I'm an exception; I'm a gloriously androgynous creature of pure information!" But if you actually want to achieve your ideal (like becoming a gloriously androgynous creature of pure information), rather than just having a human's delusion of it, you need to form accurate beliefs about just how far this world is from the ideal, because only true knowledge can help you actively shape reality.
It could very well be that information about human differences could have all sorts of terrible effects if widely or selectively disseminated. Who knows what the masses will do? I must confess that I am often tempted to say that I have no interest in such political questions--that I don't know, that it doesn't matter to me. This attitude probably is not satisfactory for the same sorts of reasons I've listed above. (How does the line go? "You might not care about politics, but politics cares about you"?) But for now, on a collective or political or institutional level, I really don't know: maybe ignorance is bliss. But for the individual aspiring rationalist, the correct course of action is unambiguous: it's better to know, than to not know, it's better to make decisions explicitly and with reason, then to let your subconscious decide for you and for things to take their natural course.
Might be just mind projection on my part, but it seems to me that in those accursed cases, where various aspects of an "egalitarian" way of thought - that includes both values, moral intuitions, ethical rules, actual beliefs about the world and beliefs about one's beliefs - all get conflated, and the entire (silly for an AI but identity-forming for lots of current humans) system perceives some statement of fact as a challenge to its entire existence... well, the LW crowd at least would pride themselves on not being personally offended.
If tomorrow it was revealed with high certainty that us Slavs are genetically predisposed against some habits that happen to be crucial for civilized living and running a state nicely, I'd most definitely try to take it in stride. But when something like this stuff is said, I tend to feel sick and uncertain; I don't see a purely consequentialist way out which would leave me ethically unscathed.
Ah, if only it was so easy as identifying the objective state of the world, than trying to act in accordance with (what you've settled on as) your terminal values.* But this would require both more rationality and more compartmentalization than I've seen in humans so far.