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ialdabaoth comments on LW Women- Minimizing the Inferential Distance - Less Wrong
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Perhaps; I think part of the issue there is that there is a political debate and a sociological engineering project, and they keep shitting all over each other.
"I think if we raise boys and girls in gender-neutral environments, their inherent gender biases will be far less noticeable" is part of the sociological engineering project.
"No! You're turning them into lesbo feminazis and fairy faggots!" is the political-debate response.
"Fuck you! I'm dressing everyone unisex and attacking everyone who doesn't!" is the political-debate counter-response.
Note that while the counter-response is crazy, it's a predictable emotional response to the prior crazy, and shouldn't be blamed on its own. My assertion is that attacking people who say "I'm dressing everyone unisex and attacking everyon who doesn't!" isn't nearly as effective as attacking the people who set them off in the first place, and hoping that they'll calm down once they're not under severe stress from people who are crazier than they do and attack them without provocation.
Does that make sense?
(I haven't read everyone elses responses, and I will shortly, but first my initial reaction): There are political debate responses and political debate responses; one can discuss policy politely and even, theoretically, rationally. Given that, I think a political debate is absolutely essential before any sociological experiment is undertaken, save for the small scale model of what you are doing to your own children, which others may comment on as noble or foolish but we should have a high bar for interference of. But if you are trying to, say, create a pressure group which coerces toy-makers to have only boys hold the dolls in their catalogues (heard about that in sweeden yesterday) I would prefer the political debate prior to a quixotic quest to rewrite human nature.
In other words, I think the social engineers are more worrisome than the "crazy" people debating them.
Modulo your deliberate use of slurs, why is that not a valid objection. In other words, are you sure you understand the full implications of this "sociological engineering project" and why should the child be one of its test subjects?
I have to support and emphasize your response here.
The attempt to make those that disagree appear to be bigoted just isn't reasonable. Even those who endorse without judgement the lifestyle of being---and overtly displaying---what some people may call a "fairy faggot" have good reason to be wary of artificially forcing particular gender identities on test subjects. In fact, it is those who have or have in the past had their gender relevant identity features crushed who are in the best position to understand the risk of this kind of intervention.
Actively changing the environment and---explicitly or implicitly---enforcing expectations about how people should behave has significant consequences, not always good. And "gender neutral" isn't a neutral intervention but instead an artificial intervention towards someone else's arbitrary ideal. Even the described intent of the project hints at this: "their inherent gender biases will be far less noticeable" is very similar to "the gender identity they are instinctively drawn to will be crushed out of them".
If "sociological engineering projects" are to be done around this area I endorse only those that engineer towards freedom to choose one's own gender role and actively crushing prejudice, judgement and presumptive influence of any party over the expression of another. Whether or not said party happens to be an authority with a conformity agenda.
It seems that there's a qualitative difference between "crushing" gender roles (David Reimer?) and simply being gender neutral (e.g. giving the same kids both dolls and space shuttle model, not just the one judged gender appropriate).
Chesterton's fence and similar Burkean arguments are generally a reasonable position. But in this case, we know:
1) There are people who desire to do things that are not acceptable within their gender roles (i.e. cross-dressing)
2) Internalizing gender narratives makes those people miserable
3) Those people (as a group) are not more likely to engage in unacceptable behaviors (i.e. molest children)
4) Prior changes to gender and other social norms have occurred without society falling apart
5) Plausible arguments exist that those changes were net benefits for society (preventing Condoleezza Rice or Hilary Clinton from being Secretary of State is wasting talent)
In short, there is obvious and significant suffering that these changes could plausibly alleviate. Comparing these changes to similar changes suggests the downside risks are low. Even Burke acknowledged that change was sometimes necessary - otherwise Burkean conservatism becomes a fully general counter-argument.
In response to 1&2, I'd point out that 2 things: there are many gender norms,which may range from frivolous or harmful cultural baggage to valuable or vital biological or sociological adaptations. And, establishing a norm can be done with a range of incentives, and we should be open to optimizing them to minimize the misery while still promoting the norms that lead to a more harmonious society.
I don't believe #3 is the main argument for establishing gender roles.
For 4, there's a lot of apart in a society to fall. Some trends that worry me I do find plausible links to prior changes to gender norms. While I'm not sure I'm prepared to argue that here, I don't think the converse is firmly established, either.
5-Probably (there are probably arguments, I mean) but I don't find simply listing two names of women in high office to be one of them.
Fine. How do we tell the difference? Also, how do we tell the difference between norms-masquerading-as-facts and facts?
Oh, I don't know if you ever know for sure, unless you find some of those social experimenters and loose them, but beware the difference between destructive and non-destructive testing. Factors I'd consider in evaluating a norm's positive utility would include universality, stability, considerations of likely effect in aggregate, and so forth.
For example, I'd feel less masculine wearing a pink shirt around North America, but guys in China did so fairly commonly, and I'd expect to find considerable variation in this across time and cultures, so I consider it a bad idea, or at least pointless, for color based gender norms to be overtly encouraged. Women being the caregivers to young children seems to have been the case across time and cultures so I'm skeptical of the notion that there's no purposeful innate difference in the mean approaches to childbearing and think people who discourage girls from playing with dolls not especially wise on the matter.
Different axioms of human nature are certainly going to give you different conclusions of course.
You'd be right; the association of pink with femininity is fairly recent.
It's not clear to me that putting a lot of effort into eliminating overt caste markers is the best way to go if you're interested in weakening caste, though.
I think it's one thing to let a child do both gender stereotypical and non-gender-stereotypical activities that they want, and quite another to try to keep them from doing gender-stereotypical activities.
As I recall, pink shirts for men were a fad in the US in the 60s and/or 70s, but googling doesn't turn up quite what I remember-- business-style shirts in fairly light pink.
More than I knew about pink shirts for men.
I agree. (worthless comment, but I decided against saying more and don't see how to delete).
And one of the factors affecting this how much they desire these things is how they were brought up.
This argument would have more force if you had specific examples of different things parents do that affect the existence of the desire to violate gender norms.
For example, J. Edgar Hoover was born in 1895 (and was a cross-dresser). There's no plausible argument that second-wave feminism (circa 1960s) or third-wave feminism (circa 1990s) had any effect on his upbringing.
If society could affect the frequency of the desire, reducing the frequency might be a viable solution. But I've yet to hear a vaguely plausible story about what parents can choose to do that would have any effect.
The cross-dressing think was probably a black legend.
In any case a single anecdote isn't strong evidence and it's pretty clear that the amount of cross dressing and other gay/trans phenomena has gone up since the 1960s and the 1990s.
This could be anthropic fallacy.
We could control for that by looking through the records of past civilizations and trying to get an idea of whether changes to gender or social norms were reliably associated with collapse.
That seems reasonable if there are no endogenous incentives rewarding crazy, but that seems like a questionable assumption for any ideology once it's gotten used to having crazy in its internal ecosystem.
I'd rather deal with that after the primary and initial source of crazy has been removed. Otherwise, it's too easy to accidentally mistake one for the other.
Rationalization being what it is, I suspect it'd be easy to mistake one for the other from the inside anyway.
Very true. So then the question becomes, given that:
is there, in fact, any way to prevent this process from occuring? or do we just have to cast our lots and hope for the best?
Well, we could take a page from Psamtik I's book and do some controlled experiments; unfortunately, any modern ethics committee would pitch a fit over that. So unless we've got a tame Bond villain with twenty years to kill and a passion for social science, that's out.
Realistically, our best bet seems to be rigorously characterizing the stuff that leads to semantic toxicity and developing strong social norms to avoid it. That's far from perfect, though, especially since it can easily be mistaken for (or deliberately interpreted as) silencing tactics in the current political environment.
Right. And at the moment, I'm not sure if that's even ideal. Here's something like my thinking:
In order to advance social justice (which I take as the most likely step towards maximizing global utility), we need to maximize both our compassion (aka ability to desire globally eudaimonic consequences) and our rationality (aka ability to predict and control consequences). This should be pretty straightforward to intuit; by this (admittedly simplistic) model,
Global Outcome Utility = Compassion x Rationality.
The thing is, once Rationality raises above Compassion, it makes sense to spend the next epsilon resource units on increasing Compassion, rather than increasing Rationality, until Compassion is higher than Rationality again.
Also, sometimes it's important to commit to a goal for the medium-term, to prevent thrashing. I've made a conscious effort, regarding social justice issues, to commit to a particular framework for six months, and only evaluate after that span has finished - otherwise I'm constantly course-correcting and feedback oscillations overwhelm the system.
That seems true -- if you've got the right path to maximizing global utility. Making this call requires a certain baseline level of rationality, which we may or may not possess and which we're very much prone to overestimating.
The consequences of not making the right call, or even of setting the bar too low whether or not you happen to pick the right option yourself, are dire: either stalemate due to conflicting goals, or a doomed fight against a culturally more powerful faction, or (and possibly worse) progress in the wrong direction that we never quite recognize as counterproductive, lacking the tools to do so. In any case eudaemonic improvement, if it comes, is only going to happen through random walk.
Greedy strategies tend to be fragile.