Peterdjones comments on Intuitions Aren't Shared That Way - Less Wrong

31 Post author: lukeprog 29 November 2012 06:19AM

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Comment author: Peterdjones 30 November 2012 11:22:14PM *  0 points [-]

They're all just valid. You haven't got to sound yet.

The empirical facts are a vanishingly small subset of the things we can know

OK, I see what you mean better now. For one single empirical fact (sound premise) on can generate an infinite number of sound logical sentences, which basically say the same thing in ever more complicated ways. If p is true, (p & T) is true as are (p & T &T..). Many people have the instict that these are trivial "cambridge" truths and don;t add up to konwing an extra countable infinity of facts every time you learn one empirical fact.

It would be intersting to think about how that pans out in terns of the JTB theory.

Comment author: RobbBB 01 December 2012 07:11:21AM 1 point [-]

They're all just valid. You haven't got to sound yet.

'Valid' and 'sound' are predicated of arguments. 'p → p' and the other sentences I listed are sentences, not arguments. Sentences are true or false, not valid or invalid, nor sound or unsound.

Many people have the instict that these are trivial "cambridge" truths and don;t add up to konwing an extra countable infinity of facts every time you learn one empirical fact.

Perhaps, but it will be a pretty huge project to explain 'know' in a way that clearly distinguishes the 'fake' knowledge from the real stuff.