Esar comments on Philosophy Needs to Trust Your Rationality Even Though It Shouldn't - Less Wrong

27 Post author: lukeprog 29 November 2012 09:00PM

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Comment author: [deleted] 02 December 2012 04:32:20PM 0 points [-]

Yeah, but at a sufficiently low resolution (such as my description), lots of stuff pattern-matches, so: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-motivation/#MorJudMot

I'm not saying the philosophical debate is interesting or important (or that it's not), but the claim that psychologists have settled the question relies on an equivocation on 'moral judgement': in the psychological study, giving an answer to a moral question which comports with answers given by healthy people is a sufficient condition on moral judgement. For philosophers, it is neither necessary, not sufficient. Clearly, they are not talking about the same thing.