I think the point was more about whether causality should be thought of as a fundamental part of the rules, like this, or whether it's more useful to think of causality as an abstraction that (ahem, excuse the term) "emerges" from the fundamentals when we try to identify patterns in said fundamentals.

Somewhat akin to how "meaning" exists in a computer program despite none of the bits fundamentally meaning anything, I think. My thoughts are becoming more and more confused as I type, though, which makes me wish I had an environment suitable to better concentration.

If causality isn't a special kind of logic, why is everything in the known universe made out of (a continuous analogue of) causality instead of logic in general?

Wait, if causality is a special kind of logic, how does that help answer the question? Don't we still have to answer why the universe is made of this kind of logical instead of some other?

Why not Time-Turners or a zillion other possibilities?

I don't understand how lack of Time-Turners makes you think causality is a special kind of logic or why you want to incorporate causality into decision theory (which is still my bigger question). Similar questions could be asked about other features of the universe:

• Why does the universe have 3 spatial dimensions instead of a zillion other possibilities?
• Why doesn't the laws of physics allow information to be destroyed (i.e., never maps 2 different states at time t to the same state at time t+1)?

But we're not concerned about these questions at the level of decision theory, since it seems possible to have a decision theory that works with an arbitrary number of dimensions, and with both kinds of laws of physics. Similarly, I don't see why we can't have a "causality-agnostic" decision theory that works in universes both with and without Time-Turners.