IlyaShpitser comments on Philosophy Needs to Trust Your Rationality Even Though It Shouldn't - Less Wrong

27 Post author: lukeprog 29 November 2012 09:00PM

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Comment author: IlyaShpitser 15 December 2012 10:45:22PM *  3 points [-]

You realize I'm arguing against do()-based causality?

Ok, I would like to state for the record that I no longer understand what you mean when you say "factor something as a causal graph" (which may well mean no one else on this site understands either). Basically everything you ever wrote on the subject of causality or causal graphs (other than exposition of standard material) is now a complete mystery to me. In particular, I don't understand what sorts of graphs are in your paper on the Newcomb's problem, or why those graphs justify you to make any sorts of conclusions about Newcomb's problem.

Graph models are overloaded, there are lots of different models that all have the same graph. You have to explain what you mean if you use graphs.