It was intended as an explanation. If you are contrasting it with science. which you think does positively confrm theories, you need to disprove Popper.

I never said science positively confirms theories. But there are so many issues with Popper that that's almost not worth discussing. We've had seventy from Popper at this point, and philosophy of science is one area where unambiguious progress has been made. I don't need to point to something that modern like Bayesianism, but just the pretty effective criticisms of Popper by Quine, Lakatos and Kuhn. Falsification is good as a rough guideline, but problems like the theory-laden nature of observations, and the fact that data can say something quite complicated about hypotheses, and other issues all make Popper not a sound basis for science either a descriptive or proscriptive level.

And if you are trying to argue that philosophy functions in a Popperian fashion, then the obvious question is why once it discovers the errors doesn't it just leave the error filled arguments alone?

Becuase philosphy is about what philosphers have thought.

So this may be in part a dispute over definitions. But simply put, it isn't at all clear why X should include "history of X" and in general it doesn't. Math, psychology, physics, medicine, art, linguistics, music, all distinguish between X and history of X. Note that many of the subjects on my list are not sciences, so any claimed distinction between science and philosophy isn't relevant here.

Who said an idea isn't connected to whether the idea is true or not.

Huh?

This should be clear: The truth value of a claim isn't connected to who espoused the claim. Even if Terry Tao says that 1+1=3, it doesn't make it more true. And the same applies for philosophers. Whether a claim was made by Plato or by Joey the bartender doesn't make the statement more or less true. (It is possible that it can provide weak heuristic usefulness about a claim being likely to be true.)

That has happened several times.

Right, and that's part of the problem in a nutshell, that the reasonable word to use here is "several" and not, "frequently" or even "every time this question comes up."

I notice you have no objection to the way physics is taught, which invariably starts with a lot of classical physics, even though it is "wrong".

The problem though isn't teaching background. If you look elsewhere in this thread you'll see that I've argued for a much more limited form of Luke's thesis, deemphasizing the classical sources in philosophy more but not eliminating. The equivalent for physics would be if before one did Newton one had a semester on Aristotle, Ptolemy, Aristarchus, Oresme, etc. And if we still saw journal articles in top tier journals discussing Aristotle's physics.

I'm serious. All the criticism of phil. is coming from people who expect it to be like science and work like science, and there is no reason it should.

It isn't just the sciences that make progress. Math makes progress, and it is far closer in its goals to philosophy than science. Linguistics is a fuzzy border as is economics, yet both make real progress. If you prefer, consider these discussions to be about whether philosophy should act more like a science, and grapple with that question. You haven't presented any argument why philosophy shouldn't act more like the sciences other than claim that for a lot of philosophers the status quo is that it doesn't.