Concluded:

Schaffer & Knobe. "Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed." [A] recent series of empirical studies [...] presented ordinary people with precisely the sorts of cases that have been discussed in the contextualism literature and gave them an opportunity to say whether they agreed or disagreed with the relevant knowledge attributions. Strikingly, the results suggest that people simply do not have the intuitions they were purported to have. Looking at this recent evidence, it is easy to come away with the feeling that the whole contextualism debate was founded on a myth. The various sides offered conflicting explanations for a certain pattern of intuitions, but the empirical evidence suggests that this pattern of intuitions does not exist. Our aim is to defend a form of contextualism in the face of this new threat. We acknowledge that some of the specific claims made by earlier contextualists might be undermined by recent experimental results, but we suggest that a different form of contextualism—based on the idea that conversational context provides the relevant contrast—can answer this empirical challenge. We then report a new series of experimental studies that provide empirical support for a contrastive view of knowledge.

Hopkins. "Factive Pictorial Experience: What's Special about Photographs?" What exactly does the specialness of traditional photography consist in? I will defend the following view. Like other pictures, traditional photographs support pictorial experience—we see things in them. But unlike our experience of other pictures, our experience of photographs is factive: it is guaranteed to reflect the facts. What we see in traditional photographs is, of necessity, true to how things were when the photograph was taken. At least, this is the experience traditional photography is designed to produce and which it does indeed produce, when everything works as it should. It is this that explains traditional photography's special epistemic status and the special experience it instils.

Jenkins & Nolan. "Disposition Impossible." Given that dispositions need not be manifested, need it even be possible for them to manifest? Can something be disposed a certain way despite the fact that it not only does not but cannot ever manifest that disposition?

Strevens. "The Explanatory Role of Irreducible Properties. "[F]or any “high-level” phenomenon—chemical, biological, psychological, economic—science claims to be able to provide, in the long term if not quite yet, a lower-level explanation, and ultimately a physical-level explanation. [...] On the other hand, philosophers have recently claimed with increasing confidence that many explanatory properties cited by higher-level sciences—being water, being a gene, being a species, being a belief, being currency—are irreducible. The aim of this paper is to show that both sides may be correct.

Woodward. "Fictionalism and Incompleteness." The modal fictionalist faces a problem due to the fact that her chosen story seems to be incomplete—certain things are neither fictionally true nor fictionally false. The significance of this problem is not localized to modal fictionalism, however, since many fictionalists will face it too. By examining how the fictionalist should analyze the notion of truth according to her story, and, in particular, the role that conditionals play for the fictionalist, I develop a novel and elegant solution to the incompleteness problem.

I think that suffices. So... does this help us determine whether philosophy is useful? Are they Doing It Wrong?