Peterdjones comments on Train Philosophers with Pearl and Kahneman, not Plato and Kant - Less Wrong

65 Post author: lukeprog 06 December 2012 12:42AM

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Comment author: Peterdjones 06 December 2012 10:35:19AM 0 points [-]

Knowledge is justified true belief.

Quite It is not clear that JTB is jut plumb wrong, post Gettier, and in case it is hardly a charge against philosophy, when philosophy noticed the problem. If Diego has a better answer , I would like to hear it. Science types like to announce that "knowledge is information", but that is inferior to JTB, because the requirement for truth has gone missing.

I agree philosophers take the reality of propositions too seriously.

I don't particularly. Think this could be a case of taking a /facon de parler/ as an ontological commitment, cf PWs.

That is not Anselm's argument, and Anselm's actual argument is not considered by philosophers (even Christian philosophers) to be sound, as originally formulated.

I believe Platinga has tried to revive it, but that is considered a novelty.

Comment author: RobbBB 06 December 2012 10:42:29AM 2 points [-]

I don't particularly. Think this could be a case of taking a /facon de parler/ as an ontological commitment, cf PWs.

It's true that some people treat 'possible worlds' and/or 'propositions' as mere eliminable manners of speech. But a lot of prominent philosophers also treat one or the other as metaphysically deep and important, as a base for reducing other things to a unified foundation rather than as a thing to be reduced in its own right. Philosophy as a whole deserves at least some criticism for taking such views seriously, for the same reason mathematics deserves criticism for taking mathematical platonism seriously.

And to clarify, the target of my criticism isn't modal realism; modal realism is a straw-man almost everywhere outside the pages of a David Lewis article. Modal realism is the doctrine that possibilia are concrete and real; I'm criticizing the doctrine that possibilia (or propositions, or mathematical entities...) are abstract and real.

I believe Platinga has tried to revive it, but that is considered a novelty.

Lots of people, from Descartes onward, have given variations on 'ontological' arguments. But that Anselm's original argument is fallacious (specifically, equivocal) is beyond reasonable doubt.