Qiaochu_Yuan comments on Train Philosophers with Pearl and Kahneman, not Plato and Kant - Less Wrong

65 Post author: lukeprog 06 December 2012 12:42AM

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Comment author: Qiaochu_Yuan 23 December 2012 11:06:14PM *  1 point [-]

Where I still take issue is that even if we know, generally speaking, "how people actually make moral decisions in practice", or "where moral intuitions come from," that does not add up to what a philosophical study of ethics is supposed to give us, which is more like: what moral decisions people ought to make, or, how people's moral intuitions ought to be refined (through argumentation, say).

I don't think Luke would disagree with this statement either. That's why the replacement for intuitionist moral philosophy isn't just moral psychology, it's "moral psychology, decision theory, and game theory." You seem to be reading more into Luke's suggestions than is there.

Are you suggesting that mentioning that political theory is part of philosophy is against the 'agreement on LW' and so should not be discussed? Or that Luke has chosen not to bring up this aspect of philosophy so as to avoid bringing up politics?

Probably the latter. It might be worth mentioning that the philosophical interests of many LWers are aimed towards artificial intelligence, and in some scenarios where the kind of philosophizing that LW people do would pay off, political theory seems irrelevant (a singleton, for example), or at least is much less relevant than a theory of ethics precise enough that you can code it into an artificial intelligence.

By 'naturalized cognitivist worldview' I mean the worldview that holds all the pertinent phenomena to be 'natural' in the sense of being discernable by physical sciences, with an emphasis on those phenomena that are part of cognitive systems. Often this comes with the idea that the most pertinent unit of analysis when studying society is the individual cognitive agent or internal processes therein.

I don't see what the latter has to do with the former. As you say, the latter point of view doesn't seem well-suited to understanding society at large. That has nothing to do with the validity of the former point of view (which I assume is being held in opposition to worldviews that allow epiphenomena).

I don't mean anything specific by 'transpersonal phenomena,' but I guess I'm trying to broadly indicate phenomena that are not bounded to an individual's cognitive apparatus.

I don't see why this isn't reducible to a naturalized cognitivist worldview. Instead of one mind you study a collection of minds.

Comment author: sbenthall 23 December 2012 11:40:38PM 0 points [-]

That's why the replacement for intuitionist moral philosophy isn't just moral psychology, it's "moral psychology, decision theory, and game theory." You seem to be reading more into Luke's suggestions than is there.

I addressed decision theory in my original comment. "And replacing ethics with decision theory would be sidestepping the metaethical question about the legitimacy of consequentialism."

I think that the replacement would implicitly make a few ethical and metaethical assumptions that are a matter of legitimate debate within academic philosophy.

Or that Luke has chosen not to bring up this aspect of philosophy so as to avoid bringing up politics? Probably the latter. ... political theory seems irrelevant

Ah, I see. While I think I understand Luke's adherence to LW's norms and interests, I think it would be very narrow-minded to think that the interests of society as a whole or the academic system in particular share the focus of LW.

As long as Luke is addressing what he sees as problems with the curriculum of philosophy departments (which is itself a rather political issue, really), wouldn't it be irrational to ignore the real context in which philosophy occurs (a sociopolitical one)?

I don't see what the latter has to do with the former. As you say, the latter point of view doesn't seem well-suited to understanding society at large.

I agree. I was just indicating a common association.

That has nothing to do with the validity of the former point of view (which I assume is being held in opposition to worldviews that allow epiphenomena).

The validity of the former point of view tends to be challenged by those with either phenomenological or social constructivist orientations. (I am not sure whether these positions 'allow epiphenomena' or not; I expect that when taken to their logical conclusion, they don't, but that they are coreducible with the cognitivist naturalist view)

I don't see why this isn't reducible to a naturalized cognitivist worldview. Instead of one mind you study a collection of minds.

I fundamentally agree. However, though I think that these can in principle be reduced to a naturalized cognitivist view (or, we could say, ontology), that doesn't mean that this can be done easily, or that that reduction will necessarily get us farther or faster than a different level of analysis.

Because of the difficulty of that reduction and the possible intractability of the social theories in their reduced form, it makes sense to continue inquiry on a social or political level. This level of analysis often evokes philosophical concepts that are not in Luke's curriculum.

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