That's why the replacement for intuitionist moral philosophy isn't just moral psychology, it's "moral psychology, decision theory, and game theory." You seem to be reading more into Luke's suggestions than is there.

I addressed decision theory in my original comment. "And replacing ethics with decision theory would be sidestepping the metaethical question about the legitimacy of consequentialism."

I think that the replacement would implicitly make a few ethical and metaethical assumptions that are a matter of legitimate debate within academic philosophy.

Or that Luke has chosen not to bring up this aspect of philosophy so as to avoid bringing up politics? Probably the latter. ... political theory seems irrelevant

Ah, I see. While I think I understand Luke's adherence to LW's norms and interests, I think it would be very narrow-minded to think that the interests of society as a whole or the academic system in particular share the focus of LW.

As long as Luke is addressing what he sees as problems with the curriculum of philosophy departments (which is itself a rather political issue, really), wouldn't it be irrational to ignore the real context in which philosophy occurs (a sociopolitical one)?

I don't see what the latter has to do with the former. As you say, the latter point of view doesn't seem well-suited to understanding society at large.

I agree. I was just indicating a common association.

That has nothing to do with the validity of the former point of view (which I assume is being held in opposition to worldviews that allow epiphenomena).

The validity of the former point of view tends to be challenged by those with either phenomenological or social constructivist orientations. (I am not sure whether these positions 'allow epiphenomena' or not; I expect that when taken to their logical conclusion, they don't, but that they are coreducible with the cognitivist naturalist view)

I don't see why this isn't reducible to a naturalized cognitivist worldview. Instead of one mind you study a collection of minds.

I fundamentally agree. However, though I think that these can in principle be reduced to a naturalized cognitivist view (or, we could say, ontology), that doesn't mean that this can be done easily, or that that reduction will necessarily get us farther or faster than a different level of analysis.

Because of the difficulty of that reduction and the possible intractability of the social theories in their reduced form, it makes sense to continue inquiry on a social or political level. This level of analysis often evokes philosophical concepts that are not in Luke's curriculum.