I agree denotationally but object connotationally. So, yes, it's true that people seeking to justify social practices that we-socially-liberal-people strongly disapprove of often make poorly-reasoned appeals to evolutionary psychology, and that this is not only bad because it's bad reasoning, but it also damages the credibility of evopsych as field, but ...

I don't know, correct me if I'm misreading your intent, but to me it seems like your comment is engaged in a mode of reasoning about conflicts between contemporary social groups, rather than reasoning about reality, and that in this venue of all places, we can actually do better. The mindset which dubs an entire area of inquiry "disgraced" because many of the thinkers working in that area are systematically biased in identifiable ways is a common one, but it's a mistake. There's absolutely nothing contradictory about simultaneously believing that many scholars whose work is labeled as "evolutionary psychology" have important insights about human nature, and also that many of their critics also have important insights, for the same reason that very different-looking maps can both usefully model different aspects of the same territory. Of course, this is not to say that "everyone is equally right"; rather, I'm saying we can talk about the actual observations and inferences under dispute, rather than getting distracted with irrelevant side issues like whether Satoshi Kanazawa is a bad person.

I think that there's so little rationality in the world today, that on the current margin it's more important for those of us who know better to explicitly say things like what I'm saying now (Social Reality Is a Strict Subset of Actual Reality; the Facts Really Aren't on Anyone's Side), rather than trying to apply social pressure in favor of our preferred ideology. I say this not because it's wrong to have ideologically-derived values (I don't like gender roles, either), but because lots of other people are already working on politics, and not very many people are working on epistemology, so that almost anyone in a position to notice this choice should take the latter. You write that "[t]he victims are currently only pointing out all the crap[;] [t]he gatekeepers need to stop sleeping on the job," but without necessarily denying that the victims are in fact victims and that the crap is in fact crap, this really seems like a distraction from the real issues.

You quote P. Z. Myers arguing that in order for a sex difference to be evolutionarily favored, there needs to be some reason why the trait in question would be adaptive in one sex but actually maladaptive in the other. To someone in the mindset of "discrediting evolutionary psychology", this might seem like a crushing objection, but to someone in the mindset of trying to understand human evolution, there's no reason to be thinking of objecting to anything; it's just a good line of reasoning that stands on its own merits. And, in fact, competent evolutionary psychologists already know it; Eliezer makes the same point (which I would imagine is standard and familiar to people who really know the literature) in his post "The Psychological Unity of Humankind":

Note, however, that in the absence of actually opposed selection pressures, the species as a whole will get dragged along even by selection pressure on a single sex. This is why males have nipples; it's not a selective disadvantage.

So I think a lot of the apparent disagreement between Myers et al. and (well-done) evolutionary psychology is illusory, as should not be surprising because Bayesian reasoners cannot agree to disagree; reality just doesn't care about our culture wars.