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Eliezer_Yudkowsky comments on By Which It May Be Judged - Less Wrong
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I haven't read either of those but will read them. Also I totally think there was a respectable hard problem and can only stare somewhat confused at people who don't realize what the fuss was about. I don't agree with what Chalmers tries to answer to his problem, but his attempt to pinpoint exactly what seems so confusing seems very spot-on. I haven't read anything very impressive yet from Dennett on the subject; could be that I'm reading the wrong things. Gary Drescher on the other hand is excellent.
It could be that I'm atypical for LW.
EDIT: Skimmed the Dennett one, didn't see much of anything relatively new there; the Sellers link fails.
So you do have a solution to the problem?
I'll take a look at Drescher, I haven't seen that one.
Try this link? http://selfpace.uconn.edu/class/percep/SellarsEmpPhilMind.pdf
Sellars is important to contemporary philosophy, to the extent that a standard course in epistemology will often end with EPM. I'm not sure it's entirely worth your time though, because an argument against classical (not Bayesian) empiricism.
Pryor and BonJour explain Sellars better than Sellars does. See: http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/courses/epist/notes/given.html
The basic question is over whether our beliefs are purely justified by other beliefs, or whether our (visual, auditory, etc.) perceptions themselves 'represent the world as being a certain way' (i.e., have 'propositional content') and, without being beliefs themselves, can lend some measure of support to our beliefs. Note that this is a question about representational content (intentionality) and epistemic justification, not about phenomenal content (qualia) and physicalism.