Eugine_Nier comments on By Which It May Be Judged - Less Wrong

35 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 10 December 2012 04:26AM

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Comment author: Eugine_Nier 13 December 2012 04:11:14AM *  1 point [-]

Eliezer thinks we'll someday be able to reduce or eliminate Magical Reality Fluid from our model, and I know of no argument (analogous to the Hard Problem for phenomenal properties) that would preclude this possibility without invoking qualia themselves.

I could define the Hard Problem of Reality, which really is just an indirect way of talking about the Hard Problem of Consciousness.

Personally, I'm an agnostic about Many Worlds, so I'm even less inclined than EY to think that we need Magical Reality Fluid to recover the Born probabilities.

As Eliezer discuses in the post, Reality Fluid isn't just for Many Worlds, it also relates to questions about stimulation.

I also don't reify logical constructs

Here's my argument for why you should.

Comment author: RobbBB 13 December 2012 04:41:04AM *  -1 points [-]

As Eliezer discuses in the post, Reality Fluid isn't just for Many Worlds, it also relates to questions about [simulation].

Only as a side-effect. In all cases, I suspect it's an idle distraction; simulation, qualia, and born-probability models do have implications for each other, but it's unlikely that combining three tough problems into a single complicated-and-tough problem will help gin up any solutions here.

Here's my argument for why you should.

Give me an example of some logical constructs you think I should believe in. Understand that by 'logical construct' I mean 'causally inert, nonspatiotemporal object.' I'm happy to sort-of-reify spatiotemporally instantiated properties, including relational properties. For instance, a simple reason why I consistently infer that 2 + 2 = 4 is that I live in a universe with multiple contiguous spacetime regions; spacetime regions are similar to each other, hence they instantiate the same relational properties, and this makes it possible to juxtapose objects and reason with these recurrent relations (like 'being two arbitrary temporal intervals before' or 'being two arbitrary spatial intervals to the left of').