Eugine_Nier comments on By Which It May Be Judged - Less Wrong
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How could you tell if you were experiencing something differently from the way a p-zombie would (or, if you are a p-zombie, if you were experiencing something differently from the way a human would)?
In every meaningful way, the cat fairy is a cat. There is no way for an epiphenomenal sentient cat to differentiate itself from a cat fairy, nor any way for a cat fairy to differentiate itself from whatever portions of 'cats' it controls (without violating the constraints on cat fairy behavior). Of course, there's also the conceivability of epiphenomenal sentient ghosts which cannot have any effect on the world but still observe. (That's one of my death nightmares—remaining fully perceptive and cognitive but unable to act in any way.)
I am experiencing something, therefore I am not a p-zombie.
Consider the possibility that you are not experiencing everything that humans do. Can you provide any evidence, even to yourself, that you are? Could a p-zombie provide that same evidence?
How is this relevant? My point is that I'm experiencing what I'm experiencing.
And p-zombies are experiencing what they're experiencing. You can't use a similarity to distinguish.
P-zombies aren't experiencing anything. By definition.
Those two statements are both tautologically true and do not contradict one another.
What would be different, to you, if you weren't experiencing anything, but were physically identical?
I wouldn't be experiencing anything.
I thought it had been established that wasn't a difference.
Are you asking what I would experience? Because I wouldn't. Not to mention that such a thing can't happen if, as I expect, subjective experience arises from physics.
Sorry, I thought you were disagreeing with me.
It is relevant because i you cannot find any experimental differences betweenn you and a you NOT experiencing, then maybe there is no such difference.
I cannot present you with evidence that I am experiencing, except maybe by analogy with yourself. I, however, know that I experience because I experience it.