Eugine_Nier comments on By Which It May Be Judged - Less Wrong

35 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 10 December 2012 04:26AM

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Comment author: Decius 21 December 2012 12:06:44AM 0 points [-]

If it is in principle possible to experience differently from what a quantum scan of the brain and body would indicate, but behave in accordance with physicalism ... how would you know if what you experienced was different from what you thought you experienced, or if what you thought was different from what you honestly claimed that you thought?

Pardon?

How could you tell if you were experiencing something differently from the way a p-zombie would (or, if you are a p-zombie, if you were experiencing something differently from the way a human would)?

But if you are a sentient cat (roll with it) then you have evidence of the epiphenomenal cats, even though this evidence is inherently subjective (since presumably the illusions are also seemingly sentient, in this case.)

In every meaningful way, the cat fairy is a cat. There is no way for an epiphenomenal sentient cat to differentiate itself from a cat fairy, nor any way for a cat fairy to differentiate itself from whatever portions of 'cats' it controls (without violating the constraints on cat fairy behavior). Of course, there's also the conceivability of epiphenomenal sentient ghosts which cannot have any effect on the world but still observe. (That's one of my death nightmares—remaining fully perceptive and cognitive but unable to act in any way.)

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 21 December 2012 03:48:44AM 1 point [-]

How could you tell if you were experiencing something differently from the way a p-zombie would (or, if you are a p-zombie, if you were experiencing something differently from the way a human would)?

I am experiencing something, therefore I am not a p-zombie.

Comment author: Decius 21 December 2012 06:01:07AM 0 points [-]

Consider the possibility that you are not experiencing everything that humans do. Can you provide any evidence, even to yourself, that you are? Could a p-zombie provide that same evidence?

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 22 December 2012 07:42:13AM 1 point [-]

Consider the possibility that you are not experiencing everything that humans do.

How is this relevant? My point is that I'm experiencing what I'm experiencing.

Comment author: Decius 22 December 2012 07:57:12AM 3 points [-]

I'm experiencing what I'm experiencing.

And p-zombies are experiencing what they're experiencing. You can't use a similarity to distinguish.

Comment author: nshepperd 22 December 2012 09:34:13AM 3 points [-]

P-zombies aren't experiencing anything. By definition.

Comment author: Kawoomba 22 December 2012 09:46:34AM 2 points [-]

Those two statements are both tautologically true and do not contradict one another.

Comment author: Decius 22 December 2012 03:38:03PM 0 points [-]

What would be different, to you, if you weren't experiencing anything, but were physically identical?

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 23 December 2012 01:44:46AM 3 points [-]

I wouldn't be experiencing anything.

Comment author: Decius 23 December 2012 04:54:06AM -1 points [-]

I thought it had been established that wasn't a difference.

Comment author: nshepperd 22 December 2012 09:45:11PM 1 point [-]

Are you asking what I would experience? Because I wouldn't. Not to mention that such a thing can't happen if, as I expect, subjective experience arises from physics.

Comment author: Decius 22 December 2012 10:33:46PM 0 points [-]

Sorry, I thought you were disagreeing with me.

Comment author: Osuniev 23 December 2012 02:36:59AM *  0 points [-]

"How is this relevant?"

It is relevant because i you cannot find any experimental differences betweenn you and a you NOT experiencing, then maybe there is no such difference.

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 24 December 2012 06:02:30AM 1 point [-]

i you cannot find any experimental differences betweenn you and a you NOT experiencing

I cannot present you with evidence that I am experiencing, except maybe by analogy with yourself. I, however, know that I experience because I experience it.