There is a difference between (say) becoming skilled at mathematics, and arbitrarily becoming convinced that you are, when in fact that doesn't happen. Both are changes in state of your mind, both are effected by thinking, but there are also truth conditions on beliefs about the state of mind. If you merely start believing that your values include X, that doesn't automatically make it so. The fact of whether your values include X is a separate phenomenon from your belief about whether they do. The problem is when you become convinced that you value X, and start doing things that accord with valuing X, but you are in fact mistaken. And not being able to easily and reliably say what is is you value is not grounds for accepting an arbitrary hypothesis about what it is.
Thanks for the answer.
Your example is an epistemic truth statement. Changing "I am good at mathematics" to "I am not good at mathematics" or vice versa does not change your utility function.
Just like saying "I am overweight" does not imply that you value being overweight, or that you don't.
I understand your point that simply saying "I value X deeply" does not override all your previous utility assessments of X. However, I disagree on how to resolve that contradiction. You want to guard against it, you'd say "it...
Many people see themselves in various groups (member of the population of their home country, or their social network), and feel justified in caring more about the well-being of people in this group than about that of others. They will argue with reciprocity: "Those people pay taxes in our country, they are entitled to more support from 'us' than others!" My question is: Is this inconsistent with some rationality axioms that seem obvious? What often-adopted or reasonable axioms are there that make this inconsistent?