I'd like to be absolutely clear on the claim that's being made here.
If I overstate the claim, understate the claim or even state it in a manner that seems unduly silly, please do correct me - my aim here is to ascertain precisely what the claim being made is.
As I understand it, you are claiming that:
current cryonics practice will preserve sufficient information that a future superintelligence (that we do not presently understand enough about to construct or predict the actions of) may, using unspecified future technologies, be able to use the information in the brain preserved using current cryonics practice to reconstruct the personality that was in said brain at the time of its preservation to a sufficient fidelity that it would count to the personality signing up for such preservation as revival;
that having no idea what technologies the superintelligence might use to perform this (presently apparently physically impossible) task and having almost no idea about almost any characteristic of this future superintelligence, beyond a list of things we know we don't want it to do, doesn't count as an objection of substance;
and that kalla724 being unable to conclusively disprove this is enough reason to dismiss kalla724's objections in toto.
Have I left anything out, overstated or understated anything here?
If the above is wildly off base, could you please summarise the actual claim in your own words?
(presently apparently physically impossible)
I understood a pretty important element in the cryonics argument is assuming that you stick to things that are feasible given our current understanding of physics, though not necessarily given our current level of technology. Conflating technology and physics here will turn the arguments into hash, so it's kinda important to keep them separate. It's generally assumed that the future superintelligences will obey laws of physics that will be pretty much what we understand them to be now, although they may apply ...
There are a lot of steps that all need to go correctly for cryonics to work. People who had gone through the potential problems, assigning probabilities, had come up with odds of success between 1:4 and 1:435. About a year ago I went through and collected estimates, finding other people's and making my own. I've been maintaining these in a googledoc.
Yesterday, on the bus back from the NYC mega-meetup with a group of people from the Cambridge LessWrong meetup, I got more people to give estimates for these probabilities. We started with my potential problems, I explained the model and how independence works in it [1]. For each question everyone decided on their own answer and then we went around and shared our answers (to reduce anchoring). Because there's still going to be some people adjusting to others based on their answers I tried to randomize the order in which I asked people their estimates. My notes are here. [2]
The questions were:
To see people's detailed responses have a look at the googledoc, but bottom line numbers were:
(These are all rounded, but one of the two should have enough resolution for each person.)
The most significant way my estimate differs from others turned out to be for "the current cryonics process is insufficient to preserve everything". On that question alone we have:
My estimate for this used to be more positive, but it was significantly brought down by reading this lesswrong comment:
In the responses to their comment they go into more detail.
Should I be giving this information this much weight? "many aspects of synaptic strength and connectivity are irretrievably lost as soon as the synaptic membrane gets distorted" seems critical.
Other questions on which I was substantially more pessimistic than others were "all cryonics companies go out of business", "the technology is never developed to extract the information", "no one is interested in your brain's information", and "it is too expensive to extract your brain's information".
I also posted this on my blog
[1] Specifically, each question is asking you "the chance that X happens and this keeps you from being revived, assuming that all of the previous steps all succeeded". So if both A and B would keep you from being successfully revived, and I ask them in that order, but you think they're basically the same question, then A basically only A gets a probability while B gets 0 or close to it (because B is technically "B given not-A")./p>
[2] For some reason I was writing ".000000001" when people said "impossible". For the purposes of this model '0' is fine, and that's what I put on the googledoc.