Note that what I posit as the apparent argument makes no contentions about continuity of self - let's assume minds can in fact be copied around like MP3s.
Yes, I'm annoyed when people pull out a hypothetical magic-equivalent superintelligence that will make everything all better as an argument so solid that the burden of proof is to disprove it: "we don't know what such a being could do (or, indeed, anything else about it), therefore you must prove that such a hypothetical being could not do (whatever magic-equivalent is needed at that point)." They don't know how to get there from here, but they're trying really hard, therefore this hypothetical being should be assumed?
"we don't know what such a being could do (or, indeed, anything else about it), therefore you must prove that such a hypothetical being could not do (whatever magic-equivalent is needed at that point)."
I just said we're assuming we know it can't break the laws of physics.
We can tell that if you blow up someone with antimatter, putting them back together would have to involve breaking the speed of light unless you start out controlling the entire surrounding light cone before the person was blown up. If the person was vitrified, there isn't a s...
There are a lot of steps that all need to go correctly for cryonics to work. People who had gone through the potential problems, assigning probabilities, had come up with odds of success between 1:4 and 1:435. About a year ago I went through and collected estimates, finding other people's and making my own. I've been maintaining these in a googledoc.
Yesterday, on the bus back from the NYC mega-meetup with a group of people from the Cambridge LessWrong meetup, I got more people to give estimates for these probabilities. We started with my potential problems, I explained the model and how independence works in it [1]. For each question everyone decided on their own answer and then we went around and shared our answers (to reduce anchoring). Because there's still going to be some people adjusting to others based on their answers I tried to randomize the order in which I asked people their estimates. My notes are here. [2]
The questions were:
To see people's detailed responses have a look at the googledoc, but bottom line numbers were:
(These are all rounded, but one of the two should have enough resolution for each person.)
The most significant way my estimate differs from others turned out to be for "the current cryonics process is insufficient to preserve everything". On that question alone we have:
My estimate for this used to be more positive, but it was significantly brought down by reading this lesswrong comment:
In the responses to their comment they go into more detail.
Should I be giving this information this much weight? "many aspects of synaptic strength and connectivity are irretrievably lost as soon as the synaptic membrane gets distorted" seems critical.
Other questions on which I was substantially more pessimistic than others were "all cryonics companies go out of business", "the technology is never developed to extract the information", "no one is interested in your brain's information", and "it is too expensive to extract your brain's information".
I also posted this on my blog
[1] Specifically, each question is asking you "the chance that X happens and this keeps you from being revived, assuming that all of the previous steps all succeeded". So if both A and B would keep you from being successfully revived, and I ask them in that order, but you think they're basically the same question, then A basically only A gets a probability while B gets 0 or close to it (because B is technically "B given not-A")./p>
[2] For some reason I was writing ".000000001" when people said "impossible". For the purposes of this model '0' is fine, and that's what I put on the googledoc.