Yes, but if the fact that it's trying to be a threat doesn't make it as great a one, why should it take priority? The fact that they're trying to be a threat is what makes them a threat at all; they probably wouldn't be one otherwise.
Is there any additional utility in stopping malevolent agents from causing the exact same amount of harm as nonmalevolent ones? I don't see why there should be.
As others have pointed out, malevolent agents can be signaled by revenge.
Malevolent agents have a preference for harming you. Malevolent agents probably have some form of intelligence, so that they can get better at harming you.
If you're doing a real calculation, it's marginal future harm reduction minus response cost with some time discount function. Obviously, there's no guarantee that you should choose to respond to the malevolent agent threat over the uncaring universe threat. The factors indicated are all of the "all other things being equal&qu...
Today's post, The Bad Guy Bias was originally published on December 9, 2008. A summary:
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