But my most essential point is this: The Unbreakable Vow is literally a perfect coordination system. That is to say, there is no way of Defecting when you made an Unbreakable Vow to Cooperate.

But on the other hand, you also can't break a vow that turns out after the fact to be a bad idea. Without it, you can adapt to circumstances and then justify your actions as having been appropriate at the time. With it, if you've made a Vow that doesn't adapt well, you're in trouble. A system of Unbreakable Vows is only a perfect coordination system if the vows themselves are perfectly thought out, which people do not achieve by default.

My point is, this system is not only better then ours, but so much better that ours pales in comparison. Yes, the devil is in the details, but still,what you are proposing is that that everyone ignores the much better option and settles for the kludgey system that we have. May I suggest that perhaps that is nothing more than status quo bias?

My issue is that you seem to be assuming that people can just "fall into" a perfect system without giving any details for how they reach that optimum rather than getting stalled at some messy hacks where they are likely to remain due to status quo bias.

What I asked for is not simply a list of ways that such a society, if perfected, would have advantages over our own. I can think of those perfectly well myself. What I asked for was an explanation of the specific steps by which you expect a society would achieve those implementations. For instance, you start out with a regular society, with crime. The Unbreakable Vow is discovered. What steps, specifically, do you believe will occur which result in the endpoint of a society where everyone is bound by a network of Unbreakable Vows to commit no crime?

Just because it seems obvious to you that the end result would be better doesn't mean that people would implement it. In a Tragedy of the Commons, there are often ways that the agents involved could arrange to cooperate among each other (each one could provide collateral which will be returned after a given period if they cooperate, but confiscated if they defect, for instance,) so that everyone will have a greater expected utility if they cooperate than if they do not cooperate, and a higher expected utility than if they did not implement a cooperation scheme. But in practice, people don't usually implement such schemes when left to their own devices. To show that people would be likely to adopt such a system, it's not sufficient to demonstrate its advantages.