I take it that the point of this thread is to find activities which exemplify a low-signalling "mental mode".
Most of the commentators have pointed to activities, as topics, which feature more or less often in our signalling conversations. My attempt to point to the manner in which we do activities, in which signals least pollute our thinking, was voted into oblivion.
Again, however, I would like to suggest that activities characterized by ecstasy and intense engagement are good examples of what RH called "a more honest mental mode".
When I talk about music or logic, for example, I fall inevitably into signalling. My thinking becomes less "honest" as it becomes less responsible to its topic and more responsible to the social perception it elicits.
But when I am intensely engaged in making music or logical proofs, my thinking sometimes, when I am working well, becomes almost entirely responsible to that activity. My "mental mode" is more "honest" as I become more responsible to the rhythms the activity itself elicits and less responsible to elicit social perception through that activity.
My guess is that how often an activity features in our signal-rich conversations is likely to be an inconsistent indicator of the extent to which our mental mode while engaged in that activity is made "dishonest" by the work of signalling. Some activities, like sex, often feature in our signalling conversations; but, when we do the activity well, I suggest, we are not typically signalling.
I suspect that we are more likely to find better examples of "honest mental modes" by looking at the manner in which an activity is done, and not the degree of social interest in the activity. In particular, I suspect that activities which demand or admit a high degree of ecstasy or engagement, -- activities, that is, in which submitting to the rhythms of the activity requires nearly full attention and so starves out whatever attention would otherwise be devoted to signalling, -- will be among the best examples of "honest mental modes".
I think by "honest" you more mean "sincere" - lacking conscious internal conflict. Sincere beliefs can be very influenced by signaling. By "honest" I meant when our beliefs about why we do things better match why we actually do them.
I take it as obvious that signaling is an important function in many human behaviors. That is, the details of many of our behaviors make sense as a package designed to persuade others to think well of us. While we may not be conscious of this design, it seems important nonetheless. In fact, in many areas we seem to be designed to not be conscious of this influence on our behavior.
But if signaling is not equally important to all behaviors, we can sensibly ask the question: for which behaviors does signaling least influence our detailed behavior patterns? That is, for what behaviors need we be the least concerned that our detailed behaviors are designed to achieve signaling functions? For what actions can we most reasonably believe that we do them for the non-signaling reasons we usually give?
You might suggest sleep, but others are often jealous of how much sleep we get, or impressed by how little sleep we can get by on. You might suggest watching TV, but people often go out of their way to mention what TV shows they watch. The best candidate I can think of so far is masturbation, though some folks seem to brag about it as a sign of their inexhaustible libido.
So I thought to ask the many thoughtful commentors at Less Wrong: what are good candidates for our least signaling activities?
Added: My interest in this question is to look for signs of when we can more trust our conscious reasoning about what to do when how. The more signaling matters, the less I can trust such reasoning, as it usually does not acknowledge the signaling influences. If there is a distinctive mental mode we enter when reasoning about how exactly to defecate, nose-pick, sleep, masturbate, and so on, this is plausibly a more honest mental mode. It would be useful to know what our most honest mental modes look like.