roystgnr comments on [LINK] Why taking ideas seriously is probably a bad thing to do - Less Wrong

23 Post author: David_Gerard 05 January 2013 11:37PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (42)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: Oligopsony 06 January 2013 01:48:26PM 3 points [-]

One thing I've noticed is that in nearly any controversy where the adherents of the heterodox position show signs of basic mental stability, the arguments for heterodoxy are stronger than the arguments for orthodoxy. In the rare cases where this is not true - for instance, creationism - I can take this as a strong indicator of orthoxy (at least against the particular heresy in question.) but how am I to take the general pattern? Should I be more skeptical of orthodoxy in general - of the likelihood of truth coming to orthodoxy given the standards of public truth evaluation which now prevail - or more trusting of it - given that heterodox positions appear to be stronger regardless of context, and are thus likely stronger for reasons other than their truth? My rough conclusion is that I should either look for me-specific biases in this matter, or else look with greater skepticism of orthodoxy in matters I have not yet investigated and greater trust in orthodoxy in matters I have investigated that the strength of arguments would otherwise lead me to believe. But I haven't thought this through fully.

Comment author: roystgnr 07 January 2013 06:12:16PM *  5 points [-]

You'll want to read an earlier Yvain blog post, then, explaining "many reasons to expect that arguments for socially dominant beliefs (which correlate highly with truth) to be worse than the arguments for fringe beliefs (which probably correlate highly with falsehood)".

Comment author: ewbrownv 08 January 2013 11:16:23PM 1 point [-]

Why would you expect the social dominance of a belief to correlate with truth? Except in the most trivial cases, society has no particular mechanism that selects for true beliefs in preference to false ones.

The Darwinian competition of memes selects strongly for those that provide psychological benefits, or are politically useful, or serve the self-interest of large segments of the population. But truth is only relevant if the opponents of a belief can easily and unambiguously disprove it, which is only possible in rare cases.

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 09 January 2013 10:42:41PM 3 points [-]

Or if acting on the damage caused by having a bad model of reality is worse than the signaling benefit of the false belief.