I don't get the impression that being seen as weird or different has particularly bad consequences, at least not among educated western adults.
In your model, the typical educated western adult would not negatively judge someone who is:
promiscuous
polygamous
voluntarily celibate (why is the expert worried about "curing" this non-problem)
mentally ill
gender non-conforming (eg cross-dressing)
a poor speaker of the native language of the community
voluntarily unemployed
male and primary child care provider
I would have great difficulty if I wanted to avoid hearing negative judgments of those or similar traits from college educated adults. I'm not sure we are communicating with the same concepts. I understand intolerance as any act that occurs primarily to make that state of being less frequent / less visible. When I take my son to the park without my wife, and others comment on how unusual I'm being, that's a kind of intolerance of my behavior.
Not that intolerance is necessarily bad. I'm quite intolerant of murderers, child-rapists, and thieves. But saying a particular intolerance isn't problematic is different from saying that type of intolerance never occurs.
How did you choose those examples?
Yes, people who talk about tolerance are not very tolerant of those things, but they are more tolerant of them (except probably mental illness) than people who do not talk about tolerance (including people 50 years ago).
It appears to me that this is pretty much the list of things where Richard Kennaway and scientism concede tolerance, but say are too minor to talk about.
Here is a new post at EconLog in which Bryan Caplan discusses how signalling contributes to the status quo bias.