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CronoDAS comments on Right for the Wrong Reasons - Less Wrong
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Sorry, I should have made my metaphor clearer. According to what you've termed Possible Experience theory, if a person claims to have a "belief" about something unempirical, they're wrong. A theory that explains why people sometimes say "two plus two equals five" is a theory of psychology, not a theory of arithmetic; similarly, a theory that explains why people sometimes say things like "there is an invisible dragon in my garage" is a theory of psychology and not a theory of epistemology.
If you can think of a better word than "belief" for me to use when I mean something like "portion of a human's model of the universe", fine, we can use that word instead, but I'd rather not argue about the meanings of words right now.
Why si that relevant? The question is how to explain belief:-
"To me it seem the problem here is simply trying to treat natural language sentences as real things when they are only an approximate abstraction, that breaks down in these kinds of edge cases.
There are no discrete "belief's" with "justifications", there are only a probability distribution over the configuration space of all possible histories of sensory input. And that's just another layer of abstraction really, but it's enough for now."
Wrong beliefs exist
exactly.
Epistemology can't ignore falsehood.