royf comments on Right for the Wrong Reasons - Less Wrong

14 Post author: katydee 24 January 2013 12:02AM

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Comment author: CronoDAS 24 January 2013 04:06:17AM 1 point [-]

Not really.

Let me elaborate:

In a book of his, Daniel Dennett appropriates the word "actualism" to mean "the belief that only things that have actually happened, or will happen, are possible." In other words, all statements that are false are not only false, but also impossible: If the coin flip comes up heads, it was never possible for the coin flip to have come up tails. He considers this rather silly, says there are good reasons for dismissing it that aren't relevant to the current discussion, and proceeds as though the matter is solved. This strikes me as one of those philosophical positions that seem obviously absurd but very difficult to refute in practice. (It also strikes me as splitting hairs over words, so maybe it's just a wrong question in the first place?)

Comment author: royf 24 January 2013 01:06:15PM *  0 points [-]

This is perhaps not the best description of actualism, but I see your point. Actualists would disagree with this part of my comment:

If I believed that "you will win" (no probability qualifier), then in the many universes where you didn't I'm in Bayes Hell.

on the grounds that those other universes don't exist.

But that was just a figure of speech. I don't actually need those other universes to argue against 0 and 1 as probabilities. And if Frequentists disbelieve in that, there's no place in Bayes Heaven for them.