DanArmak comments on CEV: a utilitarian critique - Less Wrong

25 Post author: Pablo_Stafforini 26 January 2013 04:12PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (94)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: DanArmak 28 January 2013 05:47:10PM 2 points [-]

I can see that this would lead you to want CEV of your (competing) values. But why would it lead you to want CEV of both your and other people's values?

Comment author: RomeoStevens 28 January 2013 06:45:15PM 0 points [-]

Because of the incoherent bit. I think that others are doing a better job of optimizing for the world I actually want to live in than I am in many cases.

Comment author: DanArmak 29 January 2013 10:37:18AM 3 points [-]

I think that others are doing a better job of optimizing for the world I actually want to live in than I am in many cases.

If others are optimizing for the world you want, if they are promoting your values better than you yourself are promoting them, then why do you express a wish to live in a world also optimized for their values via CEV?

Comment author: RomeoStevens 30 January 2013 10:27:06PM 0 points [-]

I can trivially account for divergent values without CEV: holodecks/experience machines. Surely holodecks are the lower bound for any utopian vision.