I read NWM as well as a number of his other papers earlier this year, and while I enjoyed them a great deal I still struggle to understand the basic motivations for and plausibility/coherence of anti-representationalism/global expressionism. Why not rest content with commonsensical expressionism within restricted domains (culture/psychology/morals)? Total metaphysical and scientific expressionism make little sense to me; it seems obvious that there must be some underlying medium that governs our "discursive practices". I haven't read FFT (waiting on the 2nd ed) but I don't see a semantic/truth theory trumping my confidence in science as a method of representational success.
Would appreciate pointers, thoughts or conversation.
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/cambridge-cabs-and-copenhagen-my-route-to-existential-risk/
Author: Huw Price (Bertrand Russell Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge)
The article is mainly about the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk and the author's speculation about AI (and his association with Jaan Tallinn). Nothing made me really stand up and think "This is something I've never heard on Less Wrong", but it is interesting to see Existential risk and AI getting more mainstream attention, and the author reproduces tabooing in his willful avoidance of attempting to define the term "intelligence".
The comments all miss the point or reproduce cached thoughts with frustrating predictability. I think I find them to be so frustrating because these do not seem to be unintelligent people (by the standards of the internet at least; their comments have good grammar and vocabulary), but they are not really processing.