Nick_Tarleton comments on Dissenting Views - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (207)
Sorry. I thought about things a little and realized that a few things about prospect theory definately need to be scrapped as bad ideas.. The probability weighing for instance. But other quirks (such as loss aversion or having different utilities for loss vs gain) might be useful to retain...
It would really be good if I knew a bit more about the different descision theories at this point. Does anyone have any good references from where one would get an overview and good references?
Differing utilities for loss vs. gain introduce an apparently absurd degree of path dependence, in which, say, gaining $10 is perceived differently from gaining $20 and immediately thereafter losing $10. Loss vs. gain asymmetry isn't in conflict with expected utility maximization (though nonlinear probability weighing is), but it is inconsistent with stronger intuitions about what we should be doing.
"Different decision theories" is usually used to mean, e.g., causal decision theory vs. evidential decision theory vs. whatever it is Eliezer has developed. Which of these you use is (AFAIK) orthogonal to what preferences you have, so I assume that doesn't answer your real question. Any reference on different types of utilitarianism might be a little more like what you're looking for, but I can't think of anyone who's catalogued different proposed selfish utility functions.
Yes -- the example I've seen is that a loss-averse agent may evaluate a sequence of say ten coinflips with -$15/+$20 payoffs positively at the same time as evaluating each individual such coinflip negatively.
Hmm:
I didn't know that. Cool.