I was not talking about this in the context of building an optimizer. I was talking about this as a simple way to as humans gauge whether we had made ethical progress or not. I still think your specific concern about my specific ideal was not warranted:
Since killing everyone qualifies as "death" I don't see how it could possibly qualify as in-bounds as a method for reaching this particular ideal. Phrased differently, for instance as "Suffering and death are bad, let's eliminate them." the ideal could certainly lead to that. But I phrased it as "Causing less suffering and death is good."
I used the wording "cause less" which means the people enacting the ideal would not be able to kill people in order to prevent people from dying. You could argue that if they kill someone that might have had four children, that four deaths were saved - however, I'd argue that the four future deaths were not originally caused by the particular idealist in question, so killing the potential parent of those potential four children would not be a way for that particular person to cause less deaths. They would instead be increasing the number of deaths that they personally caused by one, while reducing the number of deaths that they personally caused by absolutely nothing.
It does not use the word "eliminate" which is important because "eliminate" and "lessen" would result in two totally different strategies. Total elimination practically requires the death of all, as the only way for it to be perfect is for there to be nobody to experience suffering or death. "Lessen" gives you more leeway, by allowing the sort of "as good as possible" type implementation that leaves living things surviving in order to experience the lessened suffering and death.
Can you think of a way for the idealist to kill everyone in order to personally cause less death, without personally causing more death, or a reason why lessening suffering would force the idealist to go to the extreme of total elimination?
I used the wording "cause less" which means the people enacting the ideal would not be able to kill people in order to prevent people from dying.
The wording doesn't prevent that, but your elaboration here does. You've (roughly speaking) replaced a simple consequentlialist moral with a rather complex deontological one. The problems and potential failure modes change accordingly. Neither are an ideal against which I would gauge moral progress.
Ever since Eliezer, Yvain, and myself stopped posting regularly, LW's front page has mostly been populated by meta posts. (The Discussion section is still abuzz with interesting content, though, including original research.)
Luckily, many LWers are posting potentially front-page-worthy content to their own blogs.
Below are some recent-ish highlights outside Less Wrong, for your reading enjoyment. I've added an * to my personal favorites.
Overcoming Bias (Robin Hanson, Rob Wiblin, Katja Grace, Carl Shulman)