No, just the expressed befuddlement.

The problem I think is just that, to me, they both sound to me like perfectly reasonable (if vague) descriptions of complex, sentient human pain.

1 sounds to me like an attempt to capture output in the form of a flowchart. It's like trying to describe the flocking behavior of birds by reference to the Boids cellular automaton -- and insisting not that there are similar principles at work in how the birds go about solving the problem of flocking, but that birds literally run an instance of Boids in their heads and that's all there is to their flocking behavior.

I assume you believe that people (at least) have some moral worth such that they ought not be owned, whimsically destroyed, etc

Essentially. I don't consider it a fact-about-the-world per se, but that captures my alief pretty well.

I also assume you believe that stones (at least) have no moral worth and can be owned, whimsically destroyed, etc without any immediate moral consequences.

Eh. Actually I have some squick to cavalier destruction or disruption of inanimate objects, but they don't register out as the same thing. So we'll go with that.

...or 3) toss out my questions and tell me how you think it goes on your own terms.

To what extent does an entity respond dynamically to both present and historical conditions in terms impacts on its health, wellbeing, emotional and perceptual experiences, social interactions and so on? To what extent is it capable of experiencing pain and suffering? To what extent does modifying my behavior in response to these things constitute a negative burden on myself or others? To what extent do present circumstances bear on all those things?

Those aren't so much terms in an equation as independent axes of variance. There are probably some I haven't listed. They define the shape of the space; the actual answer to your question is lurking somewhere in there.

I assume you believe that people (at least) have some moral worth such that they ought not be owned, whimsically destroyed, etc. I also assume you believe that stones (at least) have no moral worth and can be owned, whimsically destroyed, etc. without any immediate moral consequences. So 1) tell me where you think the line is (even if its a very fuzzy, circumstantial one)

What makes you think there's a line? I care more about killing (or torturing) a dog than a stone, but less so than a human. Pulling the wings off flies provokes a similar, if weaker, reaction. A continuum might complicate the math slightly, but ...

The mirror test is interesting for sure, especially in a cross-species context. However, I'm far from convinced about the straightforward reading of "the expected response indicates the subject has an internal map of oneself." Since you read the Wikipedia article down that far, you could also scroll down to the "Criticisms" section and see a variety of objections to that.

Moreover, when asked to choose between the interpretation that the test isn't sufficient for its stated purpose, and the interpretation that six-year olds in Fiji aren't self-aware I rather suspect the former is more likely.

Besides all that, even if we assume self-awareness is the thing you seem to be making of it, I'm not clear how that would draw moral-worth line so neatly between humans (or some humans) and literally everything else. From a consequentialist perspective, if I assume that dogs or rats can experience pain and suffering, it seems weird to neglect them from my utility function on the basis they don't jump through that particular (ambiguous, methodologically-questionable) experimental hoop.

Are you claiming that insects and worms possess functioning sense-organs, or that they possess subjective experience of the resulting sense-data?

I'm trying to figure out why you think there's a difference between the two, at least when dealing with anything possessing a nervous system.

Were I inclined to turn this assertion into a question, it would probably be something like "what properties does a typical adult have that a typical 1-year-old lacks which makes it more OK to kill the latter than the former?" Is that the question you're asking?

More or less, yeah.