Eliezer_Yudkowsky comments on Decision Theory FAQ - Less Wrong

52 Post author: lukeprog 28 February 2013 02:15PM

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Comment author: davidpearce 04 March 2013 06:39:14PM *  3 points [-]

Yes, although our conception of epistemic and instrumental rationality is certainly likely to influence our ethics, I was making a point about epistemic and instrumental rationality. Thus imagine if we lived in a era where utopian technology delivers a version of ubiquitous naturalised telepathy, so to speak. Granted such knowledge, for an agent to act in accordance with a weaker rather than stronger preference would be epistemically and instrumentally irrational. Of course, we don't (yet) live in a era of such radical transparency. But why should our current incomplete knowledge / ignorance make it instrumentally rational to fail to take into consideration what one recognises, intellectually at least, as the stronger preference? In this instance, the desire not to have one's throat slit is a very strong preference indeed.

["Replies to downvoted comments are discouraged. Pay 5 Karma points to proceed anyway?" says this Reply button. How bizarre. Is this invitation to groupthink epistemically rational? Or is killing cows good karma?]