JonatasMueller comments on Decision Theory FAQ - Less Wrong

52 Post author: lukeprog 28 February 2013 02:15PM

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Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 12 March 2013 10:28:00PM 2 points [-]

Heh. Yes, I remember reading the section on noradrenergic vs. dopaminergic motivation in Pearce's BLTC as a 16-year-old. I used to be a Pearcean, ya know, hence the Superhappies. But that distinction didn't seem very relevant to the metaethical debate at hand.

Comment author: JonatasMueller 12 March 2013 10:39:02PM 0 points [-]

I thought it was relevant to this, if not, then what was meant by motivation?

The inherent-desirableness of happiness is your mind reifying the internal data describing its motivation to do something

Consciousness is that of which we can be most certain of, and I would rather think that we are living in a virtual world under an universe with other, alien physical laws, than that consciousness itself is not real. If it is not reducible to nonmental facts, then nonmental facts don't seem to account for everything there is of relevant.

From my perspective, this is "supernatural" because your story inherently revolves around mental facts you're not allowed to reduce to nonmental facts - any reduction to nonmental facts will let us construct a mind that doesn't care once the qualia aren't mysteriously irreducibly compelling anymore.