So are you saying the P(worse-than-death|revived) and the P(better-than-death|revived) probabilities are of similar magnitude? I'm having trouble imagining that. In my mind, you are most likely to be revived because the reviver feels some sort of moral obligation towards you, so the future in which this happens should, on the whole, be pretty decent. If it's a future of eternal torture, it seems much less likely that something in it will care enough to revive some cryonics patients when it could, for example, design and make a person optimised for experiencing the maximal possible amount of misery. Or, to put it differently, the very fact that something wants to revive you suggests that that something cares about a very narrow set of objectives, and if it cares about that set of objects it's likely because they were put there with the aim of achieving a "good" outcome.
(As an aside, I'm not very averse to "worse-than-death" outcomes, so my doubts definitely do arise partially from that, but at the same time I think they are reasonable in their own right.)
So are you saying the P(worse-than-death|revived) and the P(better-than-death|revived) probabilities are of similar magnitude?
Yes. Like, maybe the latter probability is only 10 or 100 times greater than the former probability.
If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post, even in Discussion, it goes here.