Eliezer_Yudkowsky comments on Bayesian Adjustment Does Not Defeat Existential Risk Charity - Less Wrong

43 Post author: steven0461 17 March 2013 08:50AM

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Comment author: David_Gerard 17 April 2013 01:56:50PM *  2 points [-]

Just to be clear: are we saying that a factor of 3^^^3 is a Pascal's mugging, but a factor of 10^30 isn't? (In Holden's comment above, one example in the context of Pascal's mugging-type problems is a factor of 10^10, even as that's on the order of the population of the Earth.)

I think any reasonable person hearing "8 lives saved per dollar donated" would file it with Pascal's mugging (which is Eliezer's term, but the concept is pretty simple and comprehensible even to someone thinking of less extreme probabilities than Eliezer posits; e.g. Holden, above).

In the linked thread, Rain special-pleads that the topic requires very large numbers to talk about, but jsteinhardt counters that that doesn't make humans any better at reasoning about tiny probabilities multiplied by large numbers. jsteinhardt also points out that just because you can multiply a small number by a large number doesn't mean the product actually makes any sense at all.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 17 April 2013 05:10:36PM 1 point [-]

PASCAL'S WAGER IS DEFINED BY LOW PROBABILITIES NOT BY LARGE PAYOFFS

PASCAL'S WAGER IS DEFINED BY LOW PROBABILITIES NOT BY LARGE PAYOFFS

PASCAL'S WAGER IS DEFINED BY LOW PROBABILITIES NOT BY LARGE PAYOFFS

Comment author: David_Gerard 17 April 2013 09:51:21PM *  0 points [-]

I will certainly admit that the precise label is not my true objection, and apologise if I have seemed to be arguing primarily over definitions (which is of course actually a terrible thing to do in general).