How does this balance against Eliezer's professed belief that most people don't believe in religion, but believe in belief in religion? (Which, given that religious people live longer, tend to be happier, etc, is in fact a perfectly rational belief. You don't win by conforming to what somebody says rationalism should be, you win by winning.)
I mean, strictly speaking, I'm not sure that a full evaluation supports antitheistic beliefs - that is, the belief that religion is a qualitative negative. Atheism hasn't caught up to religion in terms of social support groups, structured social activities, and inclusiveness. (Not all religions are inclusive, mind, but they tend to be -more- inclusive than the atheist groups I've encountered. Most people belong to religions that will take anybody, even if they disapprove of them.)
Given the many advantages religion does confer, and given that atheism has done little to build parallel structures, the hostility towards religion makes no sense. No matter how ugly your house, you don't knock it down until you're at the very least prepared to replace it.
The post would have been considerably better without the antitheism. Making the world more rational is a useful goal in and of itself, it really shouldn't be justified in terms of destroying something which is in fact providing useful functions to most of society.
Atheism hasn't caught up to religion in terms of [..] inclusiveness. [..] Most people belong to religions that will take anybody, even if they disapprove of them.
I agree that most of the religious groups I know of won't actually kick an atheist out of their gatherings, as long as the atheist in question is respectful of the group's practice (e.g., doesn't disrupt services to discuss the rational justification for religious belief).
On the other hand, most of the atheist groups I know of won't actually kick a theist out of their gatherings, as long as th...
Today's post, Raising the Sanity Waterline was originally published on 12 March 2009. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
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