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paper-machine comments on Personal Evidence - Superstitions as Rational Beliefs - Less Wrong
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I'm interested in whether the axioms or theorem are even wrong in this case.
Why isn't this covered under the general observation "your observations [of haunting] are very little information and move a outsider's beliefs by [very small amount], and if your own beliefs don't converge, you're just demonstrating your irrationality by overweighting your experience and ignoring how many thousands of people throughout history have felt equally freaked out by 'haunted houses' only for detailed investigation to find nothing."?
Well, the theorem calls for Bayesian agents, which humans are not...
It says if agents are rational, they will agree. Not agreeing then implies not being rational, which given the topic of OP hardly seems like a reason to modus tollens rather than modus ponens the result...