The trouble is that there is nothing in epistemic rationality that corresponds to "motivations" or "goals" or anything like that. Epistemic rationality can tell you that pushing a button will lead to puppies not being tortured, and not pushing it will lead to puppies being tortured, but unless you have an additional system that incorporates desires for puppies to not be tortured, as well as a system for achieving those desires, that's all you can do with epistemic rationality.
That's entirely compatible with my point.
Today's post, What Do We Mean By "Rationality"? was originally published on 16 March 2009. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
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This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was 3 Levels of Rationality Verification, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
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