"It's this business of saying "really want" to refer to people's impulses instead of their principles, as if their low self were the only true one, that I strongly object to; it does not help people."
I agree this something to be careful of, but on the other hand what are we to make of consistent contradictions between what someone claims to want and how they act?
Take an example I find extremely shocking, arguments by parents against other parents spending money for their children’s education. This is often put forward on the ground that it causes social inequality. If a poor parent makes this argument, I can understand it. After all it is to their child’s comparative advantage to have the children of those wealthier than themselves receive no benefit from the parents wealth. (Though in reality the more truly educated people there are the better off for all) What I can’t understand is parents who smugly announce that they could spend the money on their child‘s education, but that they will not because that would cause inequality. (granted that this argument comes more often in the hypothetical from the childless, but I have seen parents make it.)
If questioned these parents would doubtless say they love their children and want the best for their them, but should we believe them? If one believes that a child’s education is extremely important, it would seem one would do everything one could to give one’s child the best possible education. Of course maybe the parents believe that a society where money was spent on children in accordance with their ability (i.e. the smarter the more money spent on the child’s education regardless of ability to pay) would be more in their child’s interests as it would make society wealthier and benefit their child along with every one else. However in that case it would seem that the money they will not spend on their child should go to a fund to help the bright but disadvantaged, not spent on their own consumption. If they instead spend the money on frivolity (not to put frivolity down in general), what are we to make of this?
To take this a step further what if their child is very bright and wins a scholarship to Eton. (assuming that Eton does offer a superior education. As an American, I can only go by reputation) If they refuse to let their child go on the grounds that the existence of schools like Eton cause in equality what are we to make of that? Suppose the scholarship is not to a posh school like Eton, but to a state program to educate the most gifted on the premise that this is to the general benefit of society. If the parents refuse to let their child attend because this would create social inequality, because their child is already “privileged” by superior intelligence and shouldn’t be given the means to make this inequality greater, what would this tell us about the parents?
At what point do we say that their behavior towards their child is inconsistent with their claim to love their child and want the best for them?
Contrariwise, what about parents who claim allegiance to the alleged moral ideal of egalitarianism, but spend vast sums of money on their child’s education giving them a massive advantage in life. At what point do you conclude that they are either neo-aristocratic paternalists or ethical egoists?
My point is that while I agree that people do fall short of their ethical ideals (I do it myself more often than I should like others to know), we can not judge people by their words alone.
What are we to think when someone says with their lips that they desire truth, but by their other cognitive deeds choose comfortable illusions over reality (or comfortable cynicism over reality)?
Robin Hanson has labeled such individuals hypocrites. In the traditional sense of the term, a hypocrite is a moral liar: someone who says a morality which they do not, themselves, believe. On the other hand, we don't always live up to the goals we set for ourselves. If I really believe that I ought to exercise at least 3 times per week, but I don't always do so, am I properly termed a "hypocrite"? The term akrasia, meaning "weakness of will" or "failure of self-control", seems more appropriate. Even if I tell all my friends that they ought to exercise 3 times per week, that doesn't necessarily make me a hypocrite. It's good advice. (Now, if I claimed to always exercise 3 times per week, knowing that this claim was false, that would be dishonest.)
Accusations of hypocrisy garner a lot more attention than accusations of akrasia - because hypocrisy is a deliberate transgression. It is tempting to say "hypocrisy" when you really mean "akrasia", because you'll get more attention, but that can cause damage to innocent bystanders. In akrasia, your transgression is your failure of will - it's fine that you advocate going to the gym more often, you just need to live up to the principle yourself. In hypocrisy, the transgression is claiming to care: you have no right to publicly advocate the moral principle, because (the accuser says) you don't believe in it yourself.
Will Wilkinson asked Hanson: "Would it be a kind of victory if people who now say that they care about truth, but who really don't, started admitting that they really don't?"
But much more importantly: who says that people who claim to care about truth, and then deceive themselves, "really don't care" about the truth? Why not say that they really care about the truth (as is right and proper), but they aren't living up to their own morals?
It may be standard practice in economics to deduce "preferences" from actions rather than declarations, but that's because you're trying to predict, in a scientific sense, what the subject will do next - trying to build good economic models. Moral philosophy is a different bag o' worms. At the very least, it is a controversial step in moral reasoning to decide that people's emotional impulses and subconscious pressures, rather than their declarative moral reasoning processes and the words that issue from their lips, constitute their "real selves". We should then call akrasia, not weakness of will, but strength of will.
To put the dilemma more sharply: The one comes before you and pleads, "I know that I have many times been guilty of self-deception. I have bought lottery tickets, I have overestimated my driving skills, I have planned optimistically, I have refused to confront contradictory evidence. I am weak. And yet I desire to do better. Will you help me?"
So that is words issuing from the lips, which say one thing. And it may be that the one has committed other deeds which say something else. Who is the real person? Does that question have an answer, or only a definition?
I do not frame an answer. It is only needful for me to know that something has asked for my help. There is something here that can ally to me, in our quest for truth - whether or not you call it the "real self". Whether or not, for that matter, you call me my "real self". If the word "I", when I use it, does not refer to the cognitive pattern that authors these words on your computer screen, what does it refer to? And if the words that issue from some other's lips should declare me to be a ghost, then I will seek out my fellow truthseeking ghosts, and have company in my phantom quest.