Vladimir_Nesov comments on Pascal's Muggle: Infinitesimal Priors and Strong Evidence - Less Wrong

43 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 08 May 2013 12:43AM

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Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 16 May 2013 09:52:04PM 1 point [-]

If we see that a utility function is causing our agent to take the wrong actions, then it makes sense to change it to better reflect the actions we wish our agent to take.

If the agent defines its utility indirectly in terms of designer's preference, a disagreement in evaluation of a decision by agent's utility function and designer's preference doesn't easily indicate that designer's evaluation is more accurate, and if it's not, then the designer should defer to the agent's judgment instead of adjusting its utility.

The probability distribution, on the other hand, is a map that should reflect the territory as well as possible! It should not be modified on account of badly-behaved utility computations.

Similarly, if the agent is good at building its map, it might have a better map than the designer, so a disagreement is not easily resolved in favor of the designer. On the other hand, there can be a bug in agent's world modeling code in which case it should be fixed! And similarly, if there is a bug in agent's indirect utility definition, it too should be fixed. The arguments seem analogous to me, so why would preference be more easily debugged than world model?