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Jiro comments on Pascal's Muggle: Infinitesimal Priors and Strong Evidence - Less Wrong
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There's a probability of a scam, you're not certain that it is a scam. The small probability that you are wrong about it being a scam is multiplied by the large amount.
What if the probability of it being a scam is a function of the amount offered?
There seems to be this idea on LW that the probability of it being not a scam can only decrease with the Kolmogorov complexity of the offer. If you accept this idea, then the probability being a function of the amount doesn't help you.
If you accept that the probability can decrease faster than that, then of course that's a solution.
I can't come up with any reasons why that should be so.
I suppose that people who talk about Kolmogorov complexity in this setting are thinking of AIXI or some similar decision procedure.
Too bad that AIXI doesn't work with unbounded utility, as expectations may diverge or become undefined.