wedrifid comments on The Unselfish Trolley Problem - Less Wrong

5 Post author: elharo 17 May 2013 10:51AM

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Comment author: wedrifid 17 May 2013 04:50:36PM *  11 points [-]

Especially if you call yourself a utilitarian, as many folks here do, how can you not push?

Some are utilitarian. Most are consequentialist with some degree of altruistic preference.

Have your answer?

Flip. Push. (All else being unrealistically equal.)

Good. Now comes the third, final, and hardest question; especially for anybody who said they'd push the fat man. There is still no switch or alternate track. The trolley is still coming down the tracks, and there are still five people tied to it. You are still standing on a bridge over the tracks. But this time you're alone and the only way to stop the train is by jumping in front of it yourself. Do you jump?

No. I don't want to kill myself. I would rather the victims of the psychopath lived than died, all else being equal. But I care about my own life more than 5 unknown strangers. The revealed preferences of the overwhelming majority of other humans is similar. The only way this question is 'hard' is that it could take some effort to come up with answers that sound virtuous.

If you said yes, you would push the fat man; but you won't jump. Why?

I'm not a utilitarian. I care more about my life than about the overwhelming majority of combinations of 5 other people. There are exceptions. People I like or admire and people who are instrumentally useful for contributing to the other altruistic causes I care for. Those are the groups of 5 that I would be willing to sacrifice myself for.

Do you have a moral obligation to jump in front of the train?

No. (And anyone who credibly tried to force that moral onto me or those I cared about could be considered a threat and countered appropriately.)

If you have a moral obligation to push someone else, don't you have a moral obligation to sacrifice yourself as well?

No. That doesn't follow. It is also an error to equivocate between "I would push the fat man" and "I concede that I have a moral obligation to push the fat man".

or if you won't sacrifice yourself, how can you justify sacrificing someone else?

Exactly the same way you would justify sacrificing someone else if you would sacrifice yourself.

Do you have your answers? Are you prepared to defend them?

Defend them? Heck no. I may share my answers with someone who is curious. But defending them would imply that my decision to not commit suicide to save strangers somehow requires your permission or agreement.

But be forewarned, in part 2 I'm going to show you an actual, non-hypothetical scenario where this problem becomes very real; indeed a situation I know many LessWrong readers are facing right now; and yes, it's a matter of life and death.

So you had a specific agenda in mind. I pre-emptively reject whatever demands you are making of me via this style of persuasion and lend my support to anyone else who is morally pressured toward martyrdom.

Comment author: MugaSofer 19 May 2013 06:45:44PM *  -2 points [-]

You know, most people have a point in mind when they start writing something. It's not some sort of underhanded tactic.

Also, your own life by definition has greater instrumental value than others' because you can effect it. No non-virtuous sounding preferences required; certainly no trying to go from "revealed preferences" to someone's terminal values because obviously everyone who claims to be akraisic or, y'know, realizes they were biased and acts to prevent it is just signalling.

Comment author: wedrifid 19 May 2013 11:25:46PM 0 points [-]

You know, most people have a point in mind when they start writing something. It's not some sort of underhanded tactic.

Not something I claimed. I re-assert my previous position. I oppose the style of persuasion used in the grandparent. Specifically, the use of a chain of connotatively-fallacious rhetorical questions.

Also, your own life by definition has greater instrumental value than others' because you can effect it.

That is:

  1. Not something that follows by definition.
  2. Plainly false as a general claim. There often going to be others that happen to have more instrumental value for achieving many instrumental goals for influencing the universe. For example if someone cares about the survival of humanity a lot (ie. more than about selfish goals) then the life of certain people who are involved in combating existential risk are likely to be more instrumentally useful for said someone than their own.
Comment author: MugaSofer 20 May 2013 09:25:56PM *  -2 points [-]

Not something I claimed. I re-assert my previous position. I oppose the style of persuasion used in the grandparent. Specifically, the use of a chain of connotatively-fallacious rhetorical questions.

That's a lovely assertion and all, but I wasn't responding to it, sorry. (I didn't find the questions all that fallacious, myself; just a little sloppy.) Immediately before that statement you said "So you had a specific agenda in mind."

It was this, and the (perceived?) implications in light of the context, that I meant to reply to. Sorry if that wasn't clear.

There often going to be others that happen to have more instrumental value for achieving many instrumental goals for influencing the universe. For example if someone cares about the survival of humanity a lot (ie. more than about selfish goals) then the life of certain people who are involved in combating existential risk are likely to be more instrumentally useful for said someone than their own.

Oh, come on. I didn't say it was more instrumentally valuable than any conceivable other resource. It has greater instrumental value than other lives. Individual lives may come with additional resources based on the situation.

That's like responding to the statement "guns aren't instrumentally useful for avoiding attackers because you're more likely to injure yourself than an attacker" with "but what if that gun was the only thing standing between a psychopath and hundreds of innocent civilians? What if it was a brilliant futuristic gun that knew not to fire unless it was pointing at a certified Bad Person? It would be useful then!"

If someone says something that sounds obviously wrong, maybe stop and consider that you might be misinterpreting it? Principle of charity and all that.

(I really hope I don't turn out to have misinterpreted you, that would be too ironic.)

Comment author: wedrifid 21 May 2013 01:18:57AM 0 points [-]

I didn't find the questions all that fallacious, myself; just a little sloppy.

A complementary explanation to the ones I have already given you is that this post is optimised for persuading people like yourself, not people like me. I prefer a state where posts use styles of reasoning more likely to be considered persuasive by people like myself. As such, I oppose this post.