Wei_Dai comments on Normativity and Meta-Philosophy - Less Wrong

12 Post author: Wei_Dai 23 April 2013 08:35PM

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Comment author: Wei_Dai 24 April 2013 06:41:12AM 0 points [-]

If we try to translate sentences involving "should" into descriptive sentences about the world, they will probably sound like "action A increases the value of utility function U".

As you know, there is no commonly agreed upon way of stating "action A increases the value of utility function U" as math (otherwise decision theory would be solved). Given that, what does it mean when I say "I think we should express 'action A increases the value of utility function U' in math as X", which seems like a sensible statement? I don't see how the "should" in this sentence can be translated into something that sounds like "action A increases the value of utility function U" without making the sentence mean something obviously different.

Comment author: Pentashagon 24 April 2013 07:44:20PM 0 points [-]

Given that, what does it mean when I say "I think we should express 'action A increases the value of utility function U' in math as X", which seems like a sensible statement?

I think it makes sense as a statement about decision theories. How would a choice of which mathematical expression of 'action A increases the value of utility function U' affect actual utility? Only by affecting which actions are chosen; in other words by selecting a particular (class of) decision theory which maximizes utility due in part to its expression of what "should" means mathematically.

Comment author: cousin_it 24 April 2013 12:00:38PM *  0 points [-]

So you're saying we need to mathematically model our desire for a mathematical model of X? :-) That might be a line of attack, but I don't yet see what it gives us, compared to attacking the problem directly...