Rationality Quotes May 2013

6 Post author: katydee 03 May 2013 08:02PM

Here's another installment of rationality quotes. The usual rules apply:

  • Please post all quotes separately, so that they can be upvoted or downvoted separately. (If they are strongly related, reply to your own comments. If strongly ordered, then go ahead and post them together.)
  • Do not quote yourself.
  • Do not quote from Less Wrong itself, Overcoming Bias, or HPMoR.
  • No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.

 

Comments (387)

Sort By: Controversial
Comment author: Pablo_Stafforini 03 May 2013 03:45:45PM *  0 points [-]

The Spanish flu of 1918 killed 25-50 million people. World War II killed 60 million people; 107 is the order of the largest catastrophes in humanity’s written history. Substantially larger numbers, such as 500 million deaths, and especially qualitatively different scenarios such as the extinction of the entire human species, seem to trigger a different mode of thinking—enter into a ‘separate magisterium’. People who would never dream of hurting a child hear of an existential risk, and say, ‘Well, maybe the human species doesn’t really deserve to survive.’

Eliezer Yudkowsky, ‘Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgement of Global Risks’, in Nick Bostrom and Milan M. Ćirković (eds.), Global Catastrophic Risks, Oxford, 2008, p. 114

Retracted because it violates the spirit of one of the section rules.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 03 May 2013 08:01:37PM 2 points [-]

Thou shalt not quote Yudkowsky.

Comment author: Kawoomba 03 May 2013 09:11:16PM 6 points [-]

Thou shalt not quote Yudkowsky.

Understood.

Comment author: jaibot 03 May 2013 08:34:18PM *  15 points [-]

...how are we supposed to tell people about this rule?

Edit: Aw, I thought it was funny.

Comment author: wedrifid 04 May 2013 02:04:03AM -1 points [-]

...how are we supposed to tell people about this rule?

"We don't put quotes from Eliezer in the Rationality Quotes thread" seems to work. Quoting the expression of an authority is a way to lend persuasiveness to your rule assertion but it is not intrinsic to the process of rule explaining.

I can tell people "Don't drive through intersections when the lights are red" and I'm telling someone about the rule without quoting anything.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 06 May 2013 05:38:17AM 0 points [-]

Absolute faith corrupts as absolutely as absolute power.

-- Eric Hoffer

Comment author: Randy_M 06 May 2013 06:54:02PM 5 points [-]

Perhaps, but absolute power tends to be the more relevant one, as it definitionally also includes the means to persue the goals derived from absolute corruption.

I wonder where one could apply "Absolute" and not come up with a scary sounding conclusion. Absolute skepticism seems it would turn one into a gibbering madman. Absolute logic--well what is a dangerous AI but absolute logic plus power?

Comment author: Baruta07 06 May 2013 11:44:47PM 1 point [-]

Absolute knowledge also seems like it'd leave you gibbering... Just think about it: knowledge of everything, that is to say every atom of every single object in the universe.

I can only say Ouch

Comment author: notriddle 14 May 2013 02:13:36AM *  0 points [-]

Absolute non-contradiction? Since anything else (that is, any contradictory statement) is absolutely horrible, if absolute non-contradiction is also horrible then nothing good exists.

edit: s/than nothing/then nothing/

Comment author: DanielLC 07 May 2013 04:36:51AM 3 points [-]

Absolute goodness?

Anything else would be problematic. Making people smile is good. Tiling the universe with microscopic smiley faces is not.

Comment author: Randy_M 07 May 2013 03:28:05PM 1 point [-]

Absolute goodness seems tautalogically good. If you pick any one good trait or action and maximize it it grows ominous again.

Comment author: DanielLC 07 May 2013 06:50:11PM 2 points [-]

Absolute goodness seems tautalogically good.

That's why I chose it.

If you pick any one good trait or action and maximize it it grows ominous again.

Like the smiling example I gave.

Comment author: arborealhominid 07 May 2013 01:46:04AM 1 point [-]

"If someone tells you their results before the results are gathered, be suspicious."

Comment author: brainoil 02 May 2013 06:23:38AM 1 point [-]

"Take a step back. Look at the bigger picture. That's how you devour a whale. One bite at a time."

-Congressman Frank Underwood in the TV series House of Cards

Comment author: shminux 09 May 2013 11:54:49PM 0 points [-]

More from Scott Aaronson:

maybe there’s a yet-undiscovered law of physics implying that every Earth-like planet must eventually contain at least one kangaroo!

Replying to a many-world-like question

Comment author: wedrifid 11 May 2013 12:17:17AM *  2 points [-]

Replying to a many-world-like question

While the linked to blog post discussion is somewhat interesting it seems misleading to call it a 'many-world-like question'. In trying to extract the 'rationalist moral' from the link perhaps the best quote that I can extract is the preceding sentence:

from the hypothesis that the universe is infinite, it doesn’t logically follow that all possible Earth-like planets have to exist somewhere.

At a stretch the 'rationalist moral' could be the general principle 'Don't make logical errors just because infinity confuses you'. (I'd certainly endorse that as an often neglected insight!)

Comment author: Benito 24 May 2013 08:52:10PM *  1 point [-]

"Is this real? Or has this been happening inside my head?" "Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean that it is not real?"

  • Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows, Part 2
Comment author: gwern 25 May 2013 02:07:09AM 1 point [-]
Comment author: shminux 20 May 2013 07:32:11PM *  -1 points [-]

From Richard Feynman one last letter to his first wife, over a year after her death from TB (incidentally, antibiotics had been discovered and were being tested on humans a few months before her death; a year sooner, and she would have had a good chance of recovery):

My darling wife, I do adore you.
I love my wife. My wife is dead.
Rich.

P.S. Please excuse my not mailing this -- but I don't know your new address.

Perfectly Reasonable Deviations from the Beaten Track: The Letters of Richard P. Feynman.

The whole letter and the rest of the book is well worth reading.

(I found this interesting, given that Feynman was likely the most instrumentally rational physicist ever, and definitely did not believe in any kind of afterlife -- he surely knew he was writing it for himself.)

Comment author: JQuinton 15 May 2013 04:24:09PM 2 points [-]

The sad truth is that most evil is done by people who never make up their minds to be good or evil.

  • Hannah Arendt
Comment author: shminux 15 May 2013 05:31:10PM 2 points [-]

That's not true at all. It's those who made up their minds to be good but aren't who do the most evil.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 21 May 2013 04:58:39PM 2 points [-]

I'm not sure that's true in aggregate. I think most of the evil is done by people going along with things - like, if you talked to them about it for a while they'd concede that some aspects of what they were going along with were sort of questionable and maybe a bit bad, but they don't think about that spontaneously.

Comment author: shminux 21 May 2013 05:29:25PM *  1 point [-]

Right, sure, every evil overlord needs a group of willing henchmen and an army of reluctant-to-object enablers. So, the original quote is probably right "in aggregate", though not in the amount of evil per person. Even then, how do you attribute/distribute the amount of evil between, say, Pol Pot ordering the destruction of intelligentsia and the genocide of the Chinese minority and a peasant working his rice field in the countryside, occasionally affirming his allegiance to the regime, as required? Hmm, I recall HPMoR!Quirrell talking about it, but I'm not sure how much of it is author tract.

Comment author: JQuinton 16 May 2013 02:18:51PM -2 points [-]

I saw the quote as an allusion to friendly/unfriendly AI.

Comment author: shminux 12 May 2013 01:38:02AM *  0 points [-]

Even more from the same source:

OK, now I’ll try to address free will.

Like consciousness, free will has an aspect that seems outside the scope of scientific investigation almost by definition. Are “you” the author of your choices? Well, what exactly do we mean by “you”? No matter what sequence of physical causes, random events, or even supernatural interventions led up to your making a particular choice, a skeptic could always claim that the choice wasn’t really made by “you,” but only by an impersonating demon that looks and acts like you.

On the other hand, there’s another aspect of free will that’s perfectly within the scope of science. Namely, to what extent can your choices actually be predicted by an external entity constrained by the laws of physics? Obviously they’re at least partly predictable: advertisers, seducers, and demagogues have always known as much, and modern fMRI scans confirm it! But is there any limit to the accuracy of prediction? If there isn’t, then can at least the probabilities be predicted to arbitrary accuracy, as they can in (say) the case of radioactive decay? Or are they subject to Knightian uncertainty?

Of course, even supposing your choices were unpredictable in the strongest sense imaginable, a philosopher could always say that that’s just a practical problem, and still doesn’t mean that your choices are in any sense “free.” Well, fine—but let’s at least try to answer the “straightforward empirical question,” of whether your choices are predictable or they aren’t!

Now, it’s on this latter, predictability question that quantum mechanics might finally become relevant. Or it might not—we don’t know yet. But it’s at least conceivable that the No-Cloning Theorem puts some fundamental limit on how well you can learn the state of a chaotic dynamical system, like (say) a human brain, and that it might forbid you from making a second copy accurately enough to “instantiate a new copy of the person, with the same will” (whatever that means!). Again, I stress that I have no idea whether this is true or not; many people feel confident that the “classical, macroscopic, non-invasively measurable” degrees of freedom should already contain all the relevant information. If it were true, though, then as many others have pointed out, it could have all sorts of “applications” to resolving classic philosophical paradoxes involving brain-copying, by simply explaining what goes wrong when you try to set up the paradox.

Comment author: timtyler 21 May 2013 11:59:35PM *  3 points [-]

Rationality is not the gold standard against which all other forms of thought are to be judged. Adaptation is the gold standard against which rationality must be judged, along with all other forms of thought.

  • D. S. Wilson.
Comment author: lukeprog 14 May 2013 11:54:46PM 2 points [-]

If you attempt to make sense of the world of ideas and meanings, free will and morality, art and science and even philosophy itself without a sound and quite detailed knowledge of evolution, you have one hand tied behind your back.

Daniel Dennett

Comment author: John_Maxwell_IV 18 May 2013 08:52:33AM 5 points [-]

Does Dennett offer supporting arguments for this assertion?

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 05 May 2013 04:57:12PM 3 points [-]

Illustration of availability bias:

Baldrick: But then I will go to Hell forever for stealing.

Blackadder: Believe me, Baldrick, eternity in the company of Beelzebub, and all his hellish instruments of death, will be a picnic compared to five minutes with me... and this pencil.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LVM4jR3TZsU

Comment author: D_Malik 02 May 2013 05:43:14AM 5 points [-]

He who is firm in will molds the world to himself.

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Hermann und Dorothea, IX. 303.

Comment author: gothgirl420666 03 May 2013 02:20:54AM *  4 points [-]

Can someone please explain to me how this is a rationality quote? (not sarcastic)

Comment author: CronoDAS 04 May 2013 09:58:35PM 6 points [-]

The reasonable man adapts himself to the world. The unreasonable man persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man.

George Bernard Shaw

Comment author: elharo 17 May 2013 11:51:52AM 0 points [-]

Suppose that, unlike in the “stone soup” scenario I outlined above, it eventually becomes clear that quantum annealing can be made to work on thousands of qubits, but that it’s a dead end as far as getting a quantum speedup is concerned. Suppose the evidence piles up that simulated annealing on a conventional computer will continue to beat quantum annealing, if even the slightest effort is put into optimizing the classical annealing code. If that happens, then I predict that the very same people now hyping D-Wave will turn around and—without the slightest acknowledgment of error on their part—declare that the entire field of quantum computing has now been unmasked as a mirage, a scam, and a chimera. The same pointy-haired bosses who now flock toward quantum computing, will flock away from it just as quickly and as uncomprehendingly. Academic QC programs will be decimated, despite the slow but genuine progress that they’d been making the entire time in a “parallel universe” from D-Wave. People’s contempt for academia is such that, while a D-Wave success would be trumpeted as its alone, a D-Wave failure would be blamed on the entire QC community.

--Scott Aaronson, D-Wave: Truth finally starts to emerge

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 21 May 2013 05:01:42AM 0 points [-]

People’s contempt for academia is such that, while a D-Wave success would be trumpeted as its alone, a D-Wave failure would be blamed on the entire QC community.

Well, academia itself has been attempting to get away from doing the opposite. This is most noticeable in fields like medicine and especially psychology, where anyone disagreeing with whatever the consensus is at the moment is considered an anti-scientific flat-earther, whereas the fact that this consensus itself nearly reverses every couple decades is rarely brought up. Furthermore, on the occasions when someone does bring it up, the standard response is to say that the strength of science is that it can change it's consensus.

Comment author: satt 22 May 2013 01:47:14AM 2 points [-]

This is most noticeable in fields like medicine and especially psychology, where anyone disagreeing with whatever the consensus is at the moment is considered an anti-scientific flat-earther, whereas the fact that this consensus itself nearly reverses every couple decades is rarely brought up.

Which vicennial cycles of academic consensus have you found most noticeable?

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 22 May 2013 06:08:04AM 2 points [-]

Well, the standard example is nutrition advice. Other reasonably well-known examples include whether post-menopausal women should take estrogen supplements, and how dangerous marijuana is. An example with a longer period is the whole issue with eugenics.

Comment author: gwern 01 June 2013 09:36:41PM *  0 points [-]

whether post-menopausal women should take estrogen supplements, and how dangerous marijuana is

How many times has the academic consensus on those reversed, and does that match your original claim that for these century-plus old fields like medicine,

the fact that this consensus itself nearly reverses every couple decades is rarely brought up

?

EDIT: feel free to reply to my challenge any time, Eugine.

Comment author: JQuinton 07 May 2013 03:49:32PM 4 points [-]

Time is a created thing. To say "I don't have time" is to say "I don't want to"

  • Lao Tzu
Comment author: wedrifid 07 May 2013 05:56:55PM *  4 points [-]

Time is a created thing. To say "I don't have time" is to say "I don't want to"

Lao Tzu

This is technically true for inclusive definitions of 'want' but highly misleading. There is a world of difference between "I want X but the opportunity cost (Y) is too great" and "I actively prefer !X". X and Y may be the prevention of parasitic worm infections and combating malaria. Precisely which limited resource is being allocated (time or money) changes little.

If "I don't have time" is to be replaced with an expression which conveys more personal acceptance of responsibility then it would be reasonable to translate it to "I have other priorities" but verging on disingenuous to translate it into "I don't want to".

Comment author: Lumifer 16 May 2013 08:12:56PM 1 point [-]

This is technically true for inclusive definitions of 'want' but highly misleading.

I think you're reading this too literally. To my mind this says "You have the power to allocate your time" which is a non-trivial realization to some people. You can also understand this as saying "You allocate time to tasks according to how much you want to do them", an observation which also does not always rise to the conscious level.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 16 May 2013 09:01:38PM 1 point [-]

You can also understand this as saying "You allocate time to tasks according to how much you want to do them", an observation which also does not always rise to the conscious level.

This also requires a strange definition of "want" in order to become correct. Actions chosen for instrumental reasons sometimes differ from both the emotional urge and the all-else-equal reasoned preference, and so it's not particularly natural to include them under the label of "wanting".

Comment author: gwern 07 May 2013 05:41:31PM 7 points [-]

Citation? I've read the Tao Teh Ching in a few translations and I don't recognize that at all; a Google and Google Books makes it sound like the usual apocrypha.

Comment author: JQuinton 07 May 2013 08:22:33PM 1 point [-]

Yeah, I could only find it in Google so I don't know the actual source. Lao Tzu is as good as any name, I suppose, if the name is translated literally.

Comment author: CronoDAS 04 May 2013 09:43:52PM -2 points [-]
Comment author: MixedNuts 08 May 2013 10:54:13PM 1 point [-]

"If you are too different, you're probably going to break up" is not so groundbreaking that it's worth three minutes of your readers' lives.

Comment author: Stabilizer 02 May 2013 01:25:06AM 6 points [-]

When you have spoken the word, it reigns over you. When it is unspoken you reign over it.

-Arabian proverb

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 03 May 2013 08:07:03PM 3 points [-]

...this seems exactly, diametrically wrong.

Comment author: wedrifid 04 May 2013 01:49:00AM 9 points [-]

...this seems exactly, diametrically wrong.

I would have said merely wrong. ie. When reversed it would still be stupidity. There seem to be both advantages and disadvantages to public expression with respect to it influencing you. Something along the lines of identity commitments on one side and the potential for denial, hypocrisy and lack of feedback on the other.

Comment author: cody-bryce 20 May 2013 02:39:50PM 3 points [-]

A not-entirely-different quote has been posted in the past

The words "I am..." are potent words; be careful what you hitch them to. The thing you're claiming has a way of reaching back and claiming you.

–A.L. Kitselman

Comment author: DanielLC 07 May 2013 04:29:20AM 1 point [-]

I'm not sure what that means.

Comment author: lukeprog 05 May 2013 08:06:46PM 5 points [-]

In Germany in 1911 the minimum requirement for a professor was a head circumference of 52 centimeters. This was used to discriminate against women; [one] leading medical physicist of the time stated: "We do not have to ask for the head circumference of women of genius — they do not exist." At the same time... a French scientist of note pointed out that, on average, women had brains which were closer in size to gorillas than they were to those of men! These serve as good examples of trying to use some sort of measure to come to the conclusion that was wanted... in the first place.

Kevin Warwick

Comment author: katydee 01 May 2013 09:42:21AM 7 points [-]

I am also thankful that, once I had an appetite for philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of some so-called wise man, and that I did not waste my time publishing or attempting to solve logical puzzles, or busy myself with observing the sky.

-Marcus Aurelius

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 01 May 2013 04:42:45PM 3 points [-]

That's actually kind of sad. Hopefully times have changed since then.

Comment author: sixes_and_sevens 01 May 2013 06:42:45PM 31 points [-]

It's my understanding that Marcus Aurelius no longer voices this opinion.

Comment author: DanArmak 02 May 2013 05:08:50PM *  6 points [-]

And the people who preserved his words to reach us were more like wise men who watched the skies and solved the puzzle of cheaply distributing text, than like emperors or philosophers.

Comment author: DanArmak 01 May 2013 01:12:14PM 2 points [-]

Observing the sky is good and productive science. Perhaps he meant that as an emperor (or responsible senator, etc) he should not have been drawn into a serious scientific or philosophical career, but for those who can afford the time and effort, it's a fine pursuit.

Comment author: katydee 01 May 2013 04:08:43PM 11 points [-]

I was told that that part was actually a reference to astrology.

Comment author: grendelkhan 25 May 2013 07:50:06PM 11 points [-]

PROF. PLUM: What are you afraid of, a fate worse than death?
MRS. PEACOCK: No, just death; isn't that enough?

--Clue (1985)

Comment author: [deleted] 05 May 2013 03:49:28PM 27 points [-]

"Your third arrest, you go to jail for life." "Why the third?" "Because in a game a guy gets three times to swing a stick at a ball."

Hunter Felt

Comment author: skepsci 07 May 2013 02:00:09AM 0 points [-]

Witty to be sure, but obviously false. The causal connection between baseball and the content (as opposed to the name) of the law is probably fairly tenuous. The number three is ubiquitous in all areas of human culture.

Comment author: Prismattic 07 May 2013 02:33:00AM 6 points [-]

I think further investigation would reveal that is at most a Western cultural thing, not a hardwired human universal. Elsewhere in time and place, 4 has been the important number -- e.g. recurrences of 4 and 40 in the Hebrew scriptures; the importance of 4 and (negatively) 8 in Chinese culture, etc.. Possibly some other digits have performed similarly in other places as well.

Comment author: gwern 01 June 2013 09:54:40PM 4 points [-]

We can still blame the propaganda for helping make the laws appealing and getting them to pass

The first true "three-strikes" law was passed in 1993, when Washington state voters approved Initiative 593. California passed its own in 1994, when their voters passed Proposition 184 by an overwhelming majority, with 72% in favor and 28% against. The initiative proposed to the voters had the title of 'Three Strikes and You're Out', referring to de facto life imprisonment after being convicted of three felonies.[4]

And given the popularity of things named after people like "Laura's Law" or "Megan's Law", it wouldn't surprise me if the popularity was due to the rhetorical effect on the average voter.

Comment author: KnaveOfAllTrades 29 May 2013 10:54:46PM *  4 points [-]

An objection that can be brought against everything ought not to be brought against anything.

Lee Kelly.

Comment author: John_Maxwell_IV 18 May 2013 08:55:50AM *  4 points [-]

We are enormously indebted to those academics; what could be more advantageous in an intellectual contest--whether it be bridge, chess, or stock selection--than to have opponents who have been taught thinking is a waste of energy?

Warren Buffet on proponents of the efficient market hypothesis

Comment author: katydee 13 May 2013 05:59:09PM 8 points [-]

if you have to choose between two explanations and one gives you an excuse for being lazy, choose the other one.

-Paul Graham

Comment author: pjeby 01 May 2013 08:11:29PM *  17 points [-]

When I argue with reality, I lose -- but only 100 percent of the time.

-- Byron Katie, Loving What Is

Comment author: tingram 01 May 2013 09:21:16PM *  6 points [-]

To recognize that some of the things our culture believes are not true imposes on us the duty of finding out which are true and which are not.

--Allan Bloom, Giants and Dwarfs, "Western Civ"

Comment author: pjeby 01 May 2013 08:10:23PM *  6 points [-]

Reality, for me, is what is true. The truth is whatever is in front of you, whatever is really happening. Whether you like it or not, it's raining now. "It shouldn't be raining" is just a thought. In reality, there is no such thing as a "should" or a "shouldn't." These are only thoughts that we impose onto reality. The mind is like a carpenter's level. When the bubble is off to one side -- "It shouldn't be raining" -- we can know that the mind is caught in its thinking. When the bubble is right in the middle -- "It's raining" -- we can know that the surface is level and the mind is accepting reality as it is. Without the "should" and "shouldn't," we can see reality as it is, and this leaves us free to act efficiently, clearly, and sanely.

-- Byron Katie, Loving What Is

Comment author: MixedNuts 08 May 2013 10:25:29PM 1 point [-]

The naive application of that is to go around thinking "I shouldn't be thinking about 'should' all the time! I should stop doing that! I'm not thinking like I should!".

Comment author: pjeby 09 May 2013 12:58:41AM 1 point [-]

The naive application of that is to go around thinking "I shouldn't be thinking about 'should' all the time! I should stop doing that! I'm not thinking like I should!".

I have not found that this actually helps.

As Jamie Zawinski might put it, "Now you have two problems."

Comment author: AlanCrowe 01 May 2013 02:17:44PM 15 points [-]

And I told her that no matter what the org chart said, my real bosses were a bunch of mice in cages and cells in a dish, and they didn’t know what the corporate goals were and they couldn’t be “Coached For Success”, the way that poster on the wall said.

Comment author: SaidAchmiz 01 May 2013 07:31:02PM 3 points [-]

This doesn't really make sense. Just because the mice can't be coached for success, aren't aware of corporate goals, etc., it does not follow that they are one's "real bosses". Can the mice fire you? Can they give you a raise? Can they write you up for violations of corporate protocol? If you are having trouble with a coworker, can you appeal to the mice to resolve the issue? Do the mice, finally, decide what you work on? Your actual boss can take the mice away from you! Can the mice reassign you to a different boss?

Comment author: bogus 01 May 2013 07:40:08PM 0 points [-]

Can they give you a raise? ... Do the mice ... decide what you work on?

Yes, and yes. This is spelled out in the original post.

Comment author: SaidAchmiz 01 May 2013 07:49:07PM 2 points [-]

I read the original post. The mice are not giving anyone any raises. The mice are not capable of human-level cognition, and do not occupy positions of administrative power in the company. The mice are just mice.

Your actual, human boss decides whether to give you a raise, what you work on, etc. He or she might choose to implement a policy that ties your assigment and your compensation package, in some indirect way, to the behavior of the mice (although to be more accurate, to what you do with the mice), but to insist that it is therefore accurate to say that the mice are your bosses and are making the decisions that control your career, is absurd.

Comment author: AlanCrowe 01 May 2013 09:35:53PM 26 points [-]

There is, perhaps, a word missing from the English language. If Derek Lowe were speaking, instead of writing, he would put an exaggerated emphasis on the word real and native speakers of English would pick up on a special, metaphorical meaning for the word real in the phrase real boss. The idea is that there are hidden, behind the scenes connections more potent (more real?) than the overt connections.

There is a man in a suit, call him the actual boss, who issues orders. Perhaps one order is "run the toxicology tests". The actual boss is the same as the real boss so far. Perhaps another order is "and show that the compound is safe." Now power shifts to the mice. If the compound poisons the mice and they die, then the compound wasn't safe. The actual boss has no power here. It is the mice who are the real boss. They have final say on whether the compound is safe, regardless of the orders that the actual boss gave.

Derek Lowe is giving us an offshoot of an aphorism by Francis Bacon: "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." Again the point is lost if one refuses to find a poetic reading. Nature accepts no commands; there are no Harry-Potter style spells. Nature issues no commands; we do not hear and obey, we just obey. (So why is Bacon advising us to obey?)

Comment author: SaidAchmiz 01 May 2013 11:29:43PM 1 point [-]

I'm afraid I just don't buy it. The distinguishing feature of one's boss is that this person has certain kinds of (formally recognized) power over you within your organization's hierarchy. No one thinks that their boss has the power to rearrange physical reality at a whim.

My objection to the quote as a rationality quote is that it reads like this: "Because my job performance may be affected by the laws of physical reality, which my boss is powerless to alter, he (the boss) in fact has no power over me!" Which is silly. It's a sort of sounds-like-wisdom that doesn't actually have any interesting insight. By this logic, no one has any legal/economic/social power over anyone else, and no one is anyone's boss, ever, because anything that anyone can do to anyone else is, in some way, limited by the laws of physics.

P.S. I think the Francis Bacon quote is either not relevant, or is equally vacuous (depending on how you interpret it). I don't think Bacon is "advising" us to obey nature. That would be meaningless, because we are, in fact, physically incapable of not obeying nature. We can't disobey nature — no matter how hard we try — so "advising" us to obey it is nonsense.

In a similar vein, saying that the mice have "the final say" on whether the compound is safe is nonsensical. The mice have no say whatsoever. The compound is either safe or not, regardless of the mice's wishes or decisions. To say that the have "the final say" implies that if they wished, they might say differently.

In short, I think a "poetic reading" just misleads us into seeing nonexistent wisdom in vacuous formulations.

Comment author: lukeprog 14 May 2013 08:04:12PM 8 points [-]

You can't do much carpentry with your bare hands, and you can't do much thinking with your bare brain.

Bo Dahlbom

Comment author: arborealhominid 03 May 2013 01:13:52PM *  16 points [-]

One of the biggest tasks, according to Gardner, was tracking information and beliefs back to their roots. This is always important, but especially in a field as rich in hearsay as herbal medicine. One little piece of information, or an unsubstantiated report, can grow and become magnified, quickly becoming an unquestioned truism. She used as an example the truism that the extracts of the herb Ginkgo Biloba might cause dangerous bleeding. Everyone says it can. The journalists say it. The doctors say it. The herbalists say it. Even I say it! It's nearly impossible to read a scientific paper on Ginkgo that doesn't mention this alleged danger. But why do we say it - where did the information come from? Turns out, there was one case report - of a single person - who couldn't clot efficiently after taking Ginkgo. Another 178 papers were published that mentioned this danger, citing only this one report. Those 178 papers were cited by over 4,100 other papers. So now we have almost 4-and-a-half thousand references in the scientific literature - not to mention the tens of thousands of references in the popular press - to the dangers of Ginkgo, all traceable back to a single person whose bleeding may or may not have been attributable to the herb.

-Adam Stark

Comment author: [deleted] 03 May 2013 12:03:52PM 16 points [-]

it is often better to pull numbers out of your arse and use them to make a decision, than to pull a decision out of your arse.

-- Paul Crowley

Comment author: David_Gerard 04 May 2013 11:39:22AM 9 points [-]

This is a claim about reality. Do we actually know that pulling numbers out of your arse actually does produce better results than pulling the decisions out directly? Or does it just feel better, because you have a theory now?

Comment author: scav 06 May 2013 11:32:54AM 1 point [-]

Well at least if you pull numbers out of your arse and then make a decision based explicitly on the assumption that they are valid, the decision is open to rational challenge by showing that the numbers are wrong when more evidence comes in. And who knows, the real numbers may be close enough to vindicate the decision.

If you just pull decisions out of your arse without reference to how they relate to evidence (even hypothetically), you are denying any method of improvement other than random trial and error. And when the real numbers become available, you still don't know anything about how good the original decision was.

Comment author: Estarlio 05 May 2013 12:32:03PM *  0 points [-]

That's a good point.

Plugging gut assumptions into models to make sure that the assumptions line up with each other generally produces better results for me. Beyond it just feeling better, it gives me things I can go away and test that I'd never have got otherwise.

Like if I think something's 75% likely to happen in X period and I think that something else is more likely to happen than that - do I think that the second thing is 80% likely to happen? And does that line up with information that I already have? Numbers force you to think proportionally. They network your assumptions together until you can start picking out bits of data that you have that are testable.

Intuitions aren't magic, of course, but they're rarely completely baseless.

Comment author: ciphergoth 12 May 2016 07:17:33PM 2 points [-]

Years later, this unsurprising intuition is spectacularly confirmed by the Good Judgement Project; details in "Superforecasting".

Comment author: maia 01 May 2013 08:08:17PM *  24 points [-]

When a problem comes along / You must whip it / Before the cream sets out too long / You must whip it / When something's goin' wrong / You must whip it

Now whip it / Into shape / Shape it up / Get straight / Go forward / Move ahead / Try to detect it / It's not too late / To whip it / Whip it good

-- Devo, on the value of confronting problems rather than letting them fester

Comment author: endoself 01 May 2013 05:17:35PM 8 points [-]

If you find it strange that I make no use of the qualities one calls heat, cold, moistness, and dryness…, as the philosophers [of the schools] do, I tell you that these qualities appear to me to be in need of explanation, and if I am not mistaken, not only these four qualities, but also all the others, and even all of the forms of inanimate bodies can be explained without having to assume anything else for this in their matter but motion, size, shape, and the arrangement of their parts.

-- René Descartes

Comment author: RolfAndreassen 03 May 2013 12:16:01AM 22 points [-]

One interesting thing about Ms. Dowd’s description of “hardball” political tactics is just how dainty and genteel her brass knuckle suggestions actually are. A speech, an appeal to reason: there is nothing here about lucrative contracts for political supporters, promises of sinecure jobs for politicians who lose their seats, a “blank check” for administrative backing on some obscure tax loophole that a particular politician could award to a favored client; there’s not even a delicate hint about grand jury investigations that can be stopped in their tracks or compromising photographs or wiretaps that need never see the light of day. Far be it from Ms Dowd to speak of or even hint at the kind of strategy that actual politicians think about when words like ‘hardball’ come to mind. Ms Dowd speaks of brass knuckles and then shows us a doily; at some level it speaks well of Ms. Dowd as a human being that even when she tries she seems unable to come up with an offer someone can’t refuse.

-- Walter Russell Mead, describing someone else's failure to understand what a desperate effort actually looks like.

Comment author: michaelkeenan 01 May 2013 04:48:52PM *  12 points [-]

Don't you understand anything about commitment, about being a pro, about sticking with what you say you wanna be? You don't do it just when you feel good. You don't do it just when you're not tired. You don't do it just when it's sunny. You do it every day of your life. You do it when it hurts to do it, when it's the last thing in the world that you wanna do, when there are a million reasons not to do it. You do it because you're a professional.

-- Teddy Atlas

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 20 May 2013 02:59:11AM 13 points [-]

"I don't really understand metaphysics or why it's needed." -- Matt Simpson

"Sketch version: There is no "no metaphysics" anwser, there is only "metaphysics I just unconsciously accept" and "metaphysics I've actually thought about". You can do it well or you can do it badly but you can't not do metaphysics." -- Andrew Summitt

Comment author: [deleted] 20 May 2013 03:43:12PM 7 points [-]

This is a wild guess, but (on the assumption that you endorse this quote) is the thought that MWI stands in relation to experimentally testable physics as something like a metaphysical thesis, and that instrumentalism doesn't lack metaphysical theses of this kind, but simply refuses to acknowledge and examine them?

Anyway, a related quote, and so far as I know the oldest of this kind:

The man who is ready to prove that metaphysical knowledge is wholly impossible..is a brother metaphysician with a rival theory of first principles. -F. H. Bradley "Appearance and Reality" 1893

Comment author: gwern 01 June 2013 09:28:19PM 0 points [-]

Reminds me of Popper (World of Parmenides):

"The adherents of the Vienna Circle of logical positivism and of the Mach Association used to say that systems of metaphysics are merely the ghosts of departed scientific theories: scientific theories that have been abandoned."

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 20 May 2013 04:23:12PM 11 points [-]

Actually, it was someone asking what the heck I meant by "reality fluid", to which the answer is that I don't know either which is why I always call it "magical reality fluid". I mean, I could add in something that sounded impressive and might to some degree be helpful along the lines of "It's the mind-projection-fallacy conjugate of 'probability' as it appears inside hypotheses about collections of real things in which some real things are more predicted to happen to me than others for purposes of executing post-observation Bayesian updates, like, if the squared modulus rule appearing in the Born statistics reflected the quantity present of an actual kind of stuff" but I think saying, "It's magic, which is the mind-projection-fallacy conjugate of 'I'm confused'" would be wiser in a conversation like that. I think it's very important not to create the illusion of knowing more than you do, when you try to operate at the frontiers of your own ability to be coherent. At the same time, refusing to digress into metaphysics even to demarcate the things that confuse you, even to form ideas which can be explicitly incoherent rather than implicitly incoherent, is indeed to become the slave of the unexamined thought.

Comment author: shminux 20 May 2013 07:02:53PM *  0 points [-]

I wonder if others find the notion of "magical reality fluid" a useful moniker for "I have no clear idea of what's going on here, but something does, so I cannot avoid thinking about it". I confess it does nothing for me.

Comment author: [deleted] 25 May 2013 12:26:25PM 2 points [-]

Hypothesis: Whether or not a readers finds that useful correlates with whether or not they've read this.

Comment author: TheOtherDave 20 May 2013 07:37:43PM 3 points [-]

FWIW, it does a fine job for me of conveying "I don't quite know what I'm talking about here."

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 20 May 2013 07:03:36PM 6 points [-]

Some people do (I have already received multiple comments to this effect). Mileage possibly varies.

Comment author: wedrifid 21 May 2013 01:34:09AM *  2 points [-]

Some people do (I have already received multiple comments to this effect). Mileage possibly varies.

Signalling sophistication and confidence when there is no object level reason for such confidence is one of the more destructive of human social incentives. I heartily endorse measures to prevent this. Seeing that someone is willing to admit uncertainty at the expense of their dignity increases the confidence I can have that their other expressions of confidence are more than social bullshit.

I would of course encourage you to stop using "magical reality fluid" as soon as possible. That is, after someone figures the philosophy (or epistemology or physics) out with something remotely approaching rigour.

Comment author: Benja 20 May 2013 09:15:26PM 1 point [-]

Much as I love the idea of this and would like it to work for me, unfortunately as far as I can tell my brain simply treats "magical reality fluid" the same way as it would something bland like "degree of reality".

Though come to think of it, I'm not actually sure whether or not I've really been saying the magical part to myself all this time. I'll try to make sure I don't leave it out in the future, and see whether it makes a difference.

Comment author: [deleted] 20 May 2013 04:26:18PM 0 points [-]

Thanks for the explanation.

Comment author: James_Miller 01 May 2013 04:56:15PM *  29 points [-]

Anybody can become angry - that is easy, but to be angry with the right person and to the right degree and at the right time and for the right purpose, and in the right way - that is not within everybody's power and is not easy.

Aristotle

Comment author: ArisKatsaris 05 May 2013 05:16:31PM 15 points [-]

It's often a good habit to keep track of seemingly identical concepts separately, just in case you're wrong and they're not identical.

-- aristosophy

Comment author: PrometheanFaun 02 June 2013 11:21:09AM 3 points [-]

However, equivalences are also the bread and butter of inference. Distinguishing more than you need to will slow you down.

Comment author: [deleted] 10 May 2013 10:27:38PM 3 points [-]

Unfortunately I only have a finite amount of storage available, so I can only do that up to a certain point.

Comment author: Qiaochu_Yuan 27 May 2013 02:31:46AM *  17 points [-]

We would all like to believe that if we win something it is because of our skill, but if we lose it is because of the good luck or cheating of our opponent. This is nowhere more apparent than in the game of backgammon. A good opponent will play in such a way that the dice rolls having highest probability will be "good rolls" for them on their next turn, enabling them to take the other player's pieces, consolidate their position, etc. However, since there is an element of randomness, when these rolls actually come up it is very difficult even for me to believe that my opponent's fortune is due to their skill rather than their luck. Whenever I am being consistently beaten by an opponent I have to fight very hard to make myself believe that there is actually something wrong with my play and figure out how to correct it.

This phenomenon is nowhere more apparent than in computer backgammon. Computer backgammon is essentially a solved problem. Unlike Chess or Go, the best neural network algorithms that run even on modest hardware will consistently beat most human players, and perhaps draw with the best in the world. In fact, we have learnt rather a lot from these algorithms. Many rules of thumb that were believed for years by most decent players have been overturned by computer simulations. Computers tend to play backgammon markedly more aggressively than is natural for a human, but we can show that they are nevertheless doing the right thing. If you are not an extremely high level player, playing against a good computer algorithm feels weird if you are used to playing against humans.

One of the most annoying results of this is that it is impossible to obtain a reliable user generated rating of a backgammon program. For example, GNU Backgammon is one of the two or three best algorithms in the world and an under-appreciated gem of the GNU project as a whole. A full 50% of the user reviews on the Ubuntu software centre accuse the program of cheating by fixing the dice rolls and give it a 1 or 2 star review. It is hilarious how many of these reviews include comments like they "know how to play" or have been "playing for a long time" as if this were evidence to support their claim. The rest of the reviews are by people who know better and they all give it 4 or 5 stars (4 is reasonable due to a few user interface quirks, but the algorithm itself is worth a 5). As a result, the averaged rating is only 3 stars, even though this is widely acknowledged as one of the three best backgammon programs in the world. It doesn't cheat because it doesn't have to, and it actually gives you mechanisms for checking that it is not cheating, e.g. entering dice rolls manually and a tutor mode that will correct your bad plays.

This phenomenon is repeated absolutely everywhere that user reviews of backgammon programs are available. On the Google Play store, I have seen this even on a program with an absolutely crappy algorithm that I can consistently beat on expert level as well as on decent ones that are backed by GNUbg. As a result, it is absolutely impossible to find out which are the good backgammon programs if you don't already know, since they all get a low average rating.

-- Matthew Leifer

Comment author: Cyan 27 May 2013 03:21:25AM *  9 points [-]

I like the quote, but I have a nitpick:

We would all like to believe that... if we lose it is because of the good luck or cheating of our opponent.

When I've lost in the first round of single-elimination tournaments, I've found myself hoping that the person who beat me would prove skilled enough to win the entire tournament. That way, my loss wouldn't mean that I totally sucked, but only that I wasn't the best. So I think the quoted observation fails to account for nuances relating to how losses inform us about our skill level.

Comment author: lukeprog 14 May 2013 08:45:43PM 17 points [-]

Philosophy... is what you have to do until you figure out what questions you should have been asking in the first place.

Daniel Dennett

Comment author: Pablo_Stafforini 02 May 2013 06:19:16PM 20 points [-]

Ownership is not limited to material things. It can also apply to points of view. Once we take ownership of an idea—whether it’s about politics or sports—what do we do? We love it perhaps more than we should. We prize it more than it is worth. And most frequently, we have trouble letting go of it because we can’t stand the idea of its loss. What are we left with then? An ideology—rigid and unyielding.

Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces that Shape Our Decisions, New York, 2008, pp. 138-139

Comment author: [deleted] 02 May 2013 03:48:24AM *  112 points [-]

"The spatial anomaly has interacted with the tachyonic radiation in the nebula, it's interfering with our sensors. It's impossible to get a reading."

"There's no time - we'll have to take the ship straight through it!"

"Captain, I advise against this course of action. I have calculated the odds against our surviving such an action at three thousand, seven hundred and forty-five to one."

"Damn the odds, we've got to try... wait a second. Where, exactly, did you get that number from?"

"I hardly think this is the time for-"

"No. No, fuck you, this is exactly the time. The fate of the galaxy is at stake. Trillions of lives are hanging in the balance. You just pulled four significant digits out of your ass, I want to see you show your goddamn work."

"Well, I used the actuarial data from the past fifty years, relating to known cases of ships passing through nebulae that are interacting with spatial anomalies. There have been approximately two million such incidents reported, with only five hundred and forty-two incidents in which the ship in question survived intact."

"And did you at all take into account that ship building technology has improved over the past fifty years, and that ours is not necessarily an average ship?"

"Indeed I did, Captain. I weighted the cases differently based on how recent they were, and how close the ship in question was in build to our own. For example, one of the incidents with a happy ending was forty-seven years ago, but their ship was a model roughly five times our size. As such, I counted the incident as having twenty-four percent of the relevance of a standard case."

"But what of our ship's moxie? Can you take determination and drive and the human spirit into account?"

"As a matter of fact I can, Captain. In our three-year history together, I have observed that both you and this ship manage to beat the odds with a measurable regularity. To be exact, we tend to succeed twenty-four point five percent more often than the statistics would otherwise indicate - and, in fact, that number jumps to twenty-nine point two percent specifically in cases where I state the odds against our success to three significant digits or greater. I have already taken that supposedly 'unknowable' factor into account with my calculations."

"And you expect me to believe that you've memorized all these case studies and performed this ridiculously complicated calculation in your head within the course of a normal conversation?"

"Yes. With all due respect to your species, I am not human. While I freely admit that you do have greater insight into fields such as emotion, interpersonal relations, and spirituality than I do, in the fields of memory and calculation, I am capable of feats that would be quite simply impossible for you. Furthermore, if I may be perfectly frank, the entire purpose of my presence on the bridge is to provide insights such as these to help facilitate your command decisions. If you're not going to heed my advice, why am I even here?"

"Mm. And we're still sitting at three thousand seven hundred to one against?"

"Three thousand, seven hundred and forty five to one."

"Well, shit. Well, let's go around, then."

The Vulcan your Vulcan could sound like if he wasn't made of straw, I guess? Link

Comment author: ChristianKl 03 May 2013 12:38:47PM *  2 points [-]

"Mm. And we're still sitting at three thousand seven hundred to one against?"

"Three thousand, seven hundred and forty five to one."

You shouldn't trust people who claim to know 4 digits of accuracy for a forcast like this. The uncertainity involved in the calcuation has to be greater.

Comment author: wedrifid 03 May 2013 01:01:43PM 20 points [-]

You shouldn't trust people who claim to know 4 digits of accuracy for a forcast like this.

You shouldn't trust a human person who makes that claim. But if we are using 'person' in a way that includes the steel-Vulcan from the quote then yes, you should.

The uncertainity involved in the calculation has to be greater.

It is all uncertainty. There is no particular reason to doubt the steel-Vulcan's ability to calibrate 'meta' uncertainties too.

In the face of all the other evidence about the relative capabilities of the species in question that the character in question is implied to have it would be an error to overvalue the heuristic "don't trust people who fail to signal humility via truncating calculations". The latter is, after all, merely a convention. Given the downsides of that convention (it inevitably makes predictions worse) it is relatively unlikely that the Vulcans would have the same traditions regarding significant figure expression.

Comment author: ChristianKl 03 May 2013 03:03:18PM 0 points [-]

You shouldn't trust a human person who makes that claim. But if we are using 'person' in a way that includes the steel-Vulcan from the quote then yes, you should.

There inherent uncertainity in the input. The steel-Vulcan in question counted one specifc case as being 24% relevant to the current question. That's two digits of accuracy.

If many of your input variables only have two digits of accuracy the end result shouldn't have four digits of accuracy.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 03 May 2013 08:04:38PM 13 points [-]

And lo, Wedrifid did invent the concept of Steel Vulcan and it was good.

Do we actually have enough fictional examples of this to form a trope? (At least 3, 5 would be better.)

Comment author: DanielLC 07 May 2013 03:59:22AM 6 points [-]

Perhaps, but on the off chance that the captain doesn't listen, giving the exact probability increases the chances of success. The Vulcan mentioned that.

Comment author: Romashka 30 December 2014 08:35:21PM 1 point [-]

What I find curious about StarTrek models of... well, intelligence, if starship building is any indication of it... is that Romulans are on the same page as Vulcans. Forget 'Vulcans are more rational/logical/... then Humans'; they haven't outstripped the other subspecies! How have they been using their philosophy since Surak?

Comment author: CCC 31 December 2014 06:08:18AM 1 point [-]

Surak's philosophy was never about improving scientific progress. Surak's philosophy was all about shutting down all hints of emotion, with the explicit intention of shutting down anger specifically, and thus preventing the entire Vulcan species from blowing itself up in a massively destructive civil war.

Vulcans, and by exension Romulans, are significantly more intelligent than humans; this is an advantage that both subspecies hold, and Surak's philosophies don't change that. Surak's philosophies speak of the inappropriateness of any sort of emotional reaction, and praise slow, careful, methodical progress, in which every factor is taken into account from all possible angles before the experiment is begun. Surak's philosophies speak out against such emotional weaknesses as enjoying one's work; a Vulcan who enjoys science may very well decide to move into a different field instead, one in which there is less danger of committing the faux pas of actually smiling. (Surak's philosophies go perhaps rather too far - to the point where a close association with a risk-taking species like humanity is probably a good thing for the Vulcans - but they do accomplish their aim of preventing extinction via civil war).

Romulans, on the other hand, have no difficulty showing emotions. Some of them will enjoy their science, they'll take risks, they'll occasionally accidentally blow themselves up with dangerous experiments (or lose their tempers and blow up other Romulans on purpose). Somehow, they've managed to avoid suicidal, self-destructive civil war so far... but I'm somehow not surprised that the Vulcans have failed to outstrip them.

Comment author: Romashka 31 December 2014 07:03:52AM 1 point [-]

And yet it is still so easy to imagine such an outcome. Actually, I am more surprised that they chose such similar roads more than they are close in achievements. For example, maybe Vulcans would have made breakthroughs in areas that have no value for Romulans, and viva a versa.

Comment author: CCC 31 December 2014 07:54:19PM 3 points [-]

That the Vulcans and the Romulans have incredibly close levels of technology is surprising, yes; but not nearly as surprising as the idea that the Humans, the Klingons, the Betazoids, and about a hundred or so other species all have such incredibly similar technology levels, and all without any hint of shared history before they developed their seperate warp drives.

Comment author: Jiro 16 December 2013 05:18:59AM -1 points [-]

What does it mean to beat the odds by X percent?

My first thought is that it means that the number of successes is (1+X) * the expected number of successes. If so, then beating a single 1-in-a-million shot means having 1 success where 1/1000000 success is expected, then X is 99999900 percent. That's an awful lot more than 29.2%. It's also strange because the exact number is affected by adding additional missions with 100% survivability--if you have 100 missions, one of which is 1 in a million odds and the rest of which are certain, and you beat them all, the number of successes is 100 while the expected number is 99.000001, and you only beat the odds by about 1%.

Comment author: Tenoke 08 May 2013 06:19:30PM *  39 points [-]

‘Hasn’t it ever occurred to you that in your promiscuous pursuit of women you are merely trying to assuage your subconscious fears of sexual impotence?’

‘Yes, sir, it has.’

‘Then why do you do it?’

‘To assuage my fears of sexual impotence.’

Joseph Heller, Catch-22

explaining /= explaining away

Comment author: elharo 31 May 2013 10:57:12AM *  4 points [-]

The most common mistake that people make in this regard is believing other people. For instance, a testimonial— whether it comes to you from a friend or blares out at you from a TV screen—is a poor criterion for determining truth.

A case in point is the experience of a writer for a popular fitness magazine who once wrote a facetious article about a “miracle supplement.” At the bottom of the page on which the article appeared, he had the magazine’s art department create a perforated square roughly the size of a postage stamp, next to which appeared the following recommendation: “For optimal muscle gains, cut out this little piece of paper and place it in a glass of water overnight. It contains a special mix of amino acids that are released in water over several hours. In the morning, remove the paper and place it on your tongue to allow the amino acids to enter your body.” He intended it as a joke, a last-minute bit of whimsy to fill a page where an advertisement had been withdrawn. His intention, however, was not communicated very well to the readers, as, within days of the magazine’s hitting the stands, the publisher was inundated with requests for “more of that awesome paper.” Many readers honestly believed that placing it on their tongues as instructed made their muscles bigger and stronger. This response is characteristic of the placebo effect, a demonstration of the power of suggestion, which impels people to buy all manner of things. If one of your friends or relatives happened to number among those who believed in this “miracle supplement,” he or she likely would have told you how “great” this product was, and you— if you put stock in testimonials—would probably have tried it.

-- Doug McDuff, M.D., and John Little, Body by Science, pp. ix-x

Comment author: Halfwit 21 May 2013 03:33:07PM 1 point [-]

I've never seen the Icarus story as a lesson about the limitations of humans. I see it as a lesson about the limitations of wax as an adhesive, - Randall Munroe.

Comment author: [deleted] 20 May 2013 05:06:03PM *  3 points [-]

Rodger Cotes defending Newton from the charge that his theory treats gravity as an occult cause:

I can hear some people disagreeing with this conclusion and muttering something or other about occult qualities. They are always prattling on and on to the effect that gravity is something occult, and that occult causes are to be banished completely from philosophy. But it is easy to answer them: occult causes are not those causes whose existence is very clearly demonstrated by observations, but only those whose existence is occult, imagined, and not yet proved.

Therefore gravity is not an occult cause of celestial motions, since it has been shown from phenomena that this force really exists. Rather, occult causes are the refuge of those who assign the governing of these motions to some sort of vortices of a certain matter utterly fictitious and completely imperceptible to the senses.

Comment author: elharo 19 May 2013 03:05:37PM -2 points [-]

When it comes to understanding how our universe evolves, religion and theology have been at best irrelevant. They often muddy the waters, for example, by focusing on questions of nothingness without providing any definition of the term based on empirical evidence. While we do not yet fully understand the origin of our universe, there is no reason to expect things to change in this regard. Moreover, I expect that ultimately the same will be true for understanding of areas that religion now considers its own territory, such as human morality.

Science has been effective at furthering our understanding of nature because the scientific ethos is based on three key principles: (1) follow the evidence wherever it leads; (2) if one has a theory, one needs to be willing to try to prove it wrong as much as one tries to prove that it is right; (3) the ultimate arbiter of truth is experiment, not the comfort one derives from one's a priori beliefs, nor the beauty or elegance one ascribes to one's theoretical models.

Lawrence M. Krauss, A Universe from Nothing, xvi

Comment author: ArisKatsaris 17 May 2013 12:59:23PM *  3 points [-]

-We can't go back. We don't understand everything yet.

-"Everything" is a little ambitious. We barely understand anything.

-Yeah. But that's what the first part of understanding everything looks like.

--from the ongoing animation xkcd: Time, dialogue transcript found here

Comment author: gwern 15 May 2013 03:10:15AM 8 points [-]

All knowledge, every empirical statement about the real world, is an "if..., then..." proposition; there is no "fact" without "theory". But we buy knowledge with the assumptions we make - the more assumptions made, the more knowledge obtained. ...all knowledge is paid for; if the assumptions are correct, we have a bargain.

--Clyde Coombs, A theory of data 1964, pg284,488

Comment author: Lumifer 16 May 2013 07:55:10PM 0 points [-]

That really asks for the Samuel Johnson's refutation...

Comment author: lukeprog 14 May 2013 11:58:56PM 10 points [-]

The chief trick to making good mistakes is not to hide them — especially not from yourself. Instead of turning away in denial when you make a mistake, you should become a connoisseur of your own mistakes, turning them over in your mind...

Daniel Dennett

Comment author: lukeprog 14 May 2013 08:43:46PM 13 points [-]

He who says "Better to go without belief forever than believe a lie!" merely shows his own... private horror of becoming a dupe... It is like a general informing his soldiers that it is better to keep out of battle forever than to risk a single wound. Not so are victories... over enemies or over nature gained.

William James

Comment author: lukeprog 14 May 2013 08:20:57PM 9 points [-]

If we think of an intuition pump as a carefully design persuasion tool, we can see that it might repay us to reverse engineer the tool, checking out all the moving parts to see what they are doing... consider the intuition pump to be a tool with many settings, and "turn all the knobs" to see if the same intuitions still get pumped when you consider different variations.

Daniel Dennett

Comment author: Jack 14 May 2013 08:21:49PM 1 point [-]

Is this from the new book?

Comment author: lukeprog 14 May 2013 08:33:57PM 1 point [-]

Yes.

And yes, it's great.

Comment author: lukeprog 14 May 2013 08:05:57PM 3 points [-]

The stony path to truth is competing with seductive, easier paths that turn out to be dead ends.

Marcel Kinsbourne, quoted in Dennett (2013)

Comment author: Kawoomba 14 May 2013 08:10:55PM 8 points [-]

Enter through the narrow gate. For wide is the gate and broad is the road that leads to destruction, and many enter through it. But small is the gate and narrow the road that leads to life, and only a few find it.

Matthew 7:13-14

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 09 May 2013 11:25:14PM 14 points [-]

This debate brings to mind one of the more interesting differences between the hard sciences and other fields. This occurs when you firmly believe A, someone makes a compelling argument, and within a few seconds you firmly believe not-A, to the point of arguing for not-A with even more vigor that you used for A just a few seconds ago.

-- Lou Scheffer

(Most recent example from my own life that springs to mind: "It seems incredibly improbable that any Turing machine of size 100 could encode a complete solution to the halting problem for all Turing machines of size up to almost 100... oh. Nevermind.")

Comment author: wedrifid 10 May 2013 12:37:36AM 4 points [-]

(Most recent example from my own life that springs to mind: "It seems incredibly improbable that any Turing machine of size 100 could encode a complete solution to the halting problem for all Turing machines of size up to almost 100... oh. Nevermind.")

That does (did?) seem improbable to me. I'd have expected n needed to be far larger than 100 before the overhead became negligible enough for 'almost n' to fit (ie. size 10,000 gives almost 10,000 would have seemed a lot more likely than size 100 gives almost 100). Do I need to update in the direction of optimal Turing machine code requiring very few bits?

Comment author: [deleted] 10 May 2013 07:10:39PM 0 points [-]

I mentally replaced “100” with “N” anyway (and interpreted “almost N” in the obvious-in-the-context way).

Comment author: wedrifid 10 May 2013 11:42:58PM -1 points [-]

I mentally replaced “100” with “N” anyway

You mentally threw away relevant information. ie. You merely made yourself incapable of thinking about what is claimed about the size of c relative to 100. That's fine but ought to indicate to you that you have little useful information to add in response to a comment that amounts to an expression of curious surprise that (c << 100).

(and interpreted “almost N” in the obvious-in-the-context way).

Where the context suggests it can be interpreted as an example of the Eliezer's-edits bug?

Comment author: [deleted] 11 May 2013 07:42:25AM 0 points [-]

Where the context suggests it can be interpreted as an example of the Eliezer's-edits bug?

I hadn't read the before-the-edit version of the comment.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 10 May 2013 03:38:17AM 4 points [-]

Do I need to update in the direction of optimal Turing machine code requiring very few bits?

In general, probably yes. Have you checked out the known parts of the Busy Beaver sequence? Be sure to guess what you expect to see before you look.

In specific, I don't know the size of the constant c.

Comment author: [deleted] 11 May 2013 07:51:32AM 6 points [-]

Pretty sure that also happens in fields other than the hard sciences. For example, it is said that converts to a religion are usually much more fervent than people who grew up with it (though there's an obvious selection bias).

(The advanced, dark-artsy version of this is claiming with a straight face to never have believed A in the first place, and hope the listener trusts what you're saying now more than their memory of what you said earlier, and if it doesn't work, claim they had misunderstood you. My maternal grandpa always tries to use that on my father, and almost always fails, but if he does that I guess it's because it does work on other people.)

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 11 May 2013 07:10:25PM 7 points [-]

The operative glory is doing it in five seconds.

Comment author: Manfred 11 May 2013 07:35:15PM 3 points [-]

And, being right.

Comment author: Nominull 18 May 2013 08:17:19AM 1 point [-]

That's harder to distinguish from the outside.

Comment author: Dorikka 10 May 2013 12:46:24AM 2 points [-]

I've also found this to be medium evidence that I'm not as informed about the subject as I thought that I was, so I back down by confidence somewhat. If I recently made an error that would have resulted in something very bad happening, I should be very careful about thinking that my next design is safe.

Comment author: yli 09 May 2013 11:49:36PM *  8 points [-]

So what's the program? Is it the one that runs every turing machine up to length 100 for BusyBeaver(100) steps, and gets the number BusyBeaver(100) by running the BusyBeaver_100 program whose source code is hardcoded into it? That would be of length 100+c for some constant c, but maybe you didn't think the constant was worth mentioning.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 09 May 2013 11:55:11PM 3 points [-]

Well, it's still encoded. But I actually meant to say "almost 100" in the original. And yes, that's the answer.

Comment author: elharo 08 May 2013 10:58:16PM 14 points [-]

One of the most impressive features of brains – especially human brains — is the flexibility to learn almost any kind of task that comes its way. Give an apprentice the desire to impress his master and a chicken-sexing task, and his brain devotes its massive resources to distinguishing males from females. Give an unemployed aviation enthusiast a chance to be a national hero, and his brain learns to distinguish enemy aircraft from local flyboys. This flexibility of learning accounts for a large part of what we consider human intelligence. While many animals are properly called intelligent, humans distinguish themselves in that they are so flexibly intelligent, fashioning their neural circuits to match the task at hand. It is for this reason that we can colonize every region on the planet, learn the local language we’re born into, and master skills as diverse as playing the violin, high-jumping and operating space shuttle cockpits.

David Eagleman, Incognito, p. 71

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 09 May 2013 02:49:20AM 6 points [-]

Minor nitpick:

learn the local language we’re born into

The reason we can learn the local language is that languages are memetically selected for learnability by humans.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 09 May 2013 08:12:23PM 4 points [-]

So is everything else except biology and physics.

Comment author: [deleted] 09 May 2013 11:01:43PM 3 points [-]

The memetic evolution of baroque music in Europe is a development towards learnability? There are probably no more than 100 people alive that can make their way through Bach's 2nd Partita for violin.

Comment author: komponisto 13 May 2013 12:47:15AM *  12 points [-]

There are probably no more than 100 people alive that can make their way through Bach's 2nd Partita for violin.

I'm pretty sure you're underestimating that by...a lot. Fermi estimate time:

Bach's sonatas and partitas for solo violin are a cornerstone of the violin repertory. We may therefore assume that every professor of violin at a major university or conservatory has performed at least one of them at least once, just like we may assume that every professor of mathematics has studied the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem. How many professors of violin are there? Let's just consider one country, the United States. Each state in the U.S. has at least two major public universities (typically "University of X" and "X State University", where X is the state); some have many more, and this doesn't even count private universities. Personal experience suggests that the average big state university has about one professor of violin. There are 50 states in the U.S., so that's 100 people already right there. And we have yet to count:

  • every other country in the world (including European countries like Germany where the enthusiasm for art music in general and J.S. Bach in particular is likely to be much higher);
  • private universities and conservatories in the U.S.;
  • members of the violin sections of professional symphony orchestras throughout the world (again, on average one in each U.S. state);
  • professional concert soloists (there may be more of these than you realize)
  • the students of the aforementioned professors (between 5 and 20 in a given semester, at least one of whom will typically be playing one of the sonatas or partitas that semester).

Thus, it wouldn't surprise me at all if there were at least 10,000 people alive who have performed one of the sonatas and partitas (to say nothing of those who would be capable of performing them). There are six of these works in total, so we can divide this already-conservative estimate by six to (under)estimate the number who have performed the Second Partita in particular. (This is likely an underestimate because many of them will have performed more than one -- indeed, all six, in a fair number of cases.)

A glance at the recordings available on Amazon, sorted by release date may help put things into perspective.

The estimate "no more than 100 alive who can make it through" would be much more appropriate for a difficult contemporary work (like, say, Melismata by Milton Babbitt) than a 300-year-old standard.

Comment author: Insert_Idionym_Here 10 May 2013 12:00:12AM 2 points [-]

It might be more accurate to say that pretty much everything, including what we call biology and physics -- humans are the ones codifying it -- is memetically selected to be learnable by humans. Not that it all develops towards being easier to learn.

Comment author: Jayson_Virissimo 09 May 2013 11:38:29PM 7 points [-]

Ever notice how you never hear humans playing music that humans aren't capable of learning to play? I think there may be some selection effects at play here...

Comment author: [deleted] 09 May 2013 11:59:43PM 3 points [-]

Well, I never notice the satisfaction of that contradiction, quite, but I do notice that the history of baroque music includes the steady achievement of theretofore unreached technical difficulty.

Comment author: BT_Uytya 06 May 2013 07:53:48PM *  5 points [-]

“Monads and atoms both are infinitely small, yet everything is made out of them; and in considering how such a paradox is possible, we must look to the interactions among them <...> But either way, we’re obliged to explain the things we see — like the church-tower — solely in terms of those interactions. ”

“Solely, Doctor? ”

“Solely, your highness. For if God made the world according to understandable, consistent laws <...> then it must be consistent through and through, top to bottom. If it is made of atoms, then it is made of atoms, and must be explained in terms of atoms; when we get into a difficulty, we cannot suddenly wave our hands and say, "At this point there is a miracle," or "Here I invoke a wholly new thing called Force which has nothing to do with atoms. " ”

Leibniz in Neal Stephenson's The Confusion

Comment author: Nisan 21 May 2013 11:20:21PM 1 point [-]

Huh, I thought the point of atoms is that they're not infinitely small.

Comment author: BT_Uytya 06 May 2013 07:40:17PM 11 points [-]

But consider: Newton has thought things that no man before has ever thought. A great accomplishment to be sure. Perhaps the greatest achievement any human mind has ever made. Very well - what does that say of Newton, and of us? Why, that his mind is framed in such a way that it can out-think anyone else's. So all hail Isaac Newton! Let us give him his due, and glorify and worship whatever generative force can frame such a mind.

Now consider Hooke. Hooke has perceived things that no man before us has ever perceived. What does that say of Hooke, and of us? That Hooke was framed in some special way? No, for just look at you, Robert - by your leave, you are stooped, asthmatic, fitful, beset by aches and ills, your eyes and ears are no better than those of men who've not perceived a thousandth part of what you have.

Newton makes his discoveries in geometrical realms, where our minds cannot go, he strolls in a walled garden filled with wonders, to which he has the only key. But you Hooke, are cheek-by-jowl with all of humanity in the streets of London. Anyone can look at the things you have looked at. But in those things you see what no one else has. You are the millionth human to look at a spark, a flea, a raindrop, the moon, and the first to see it. For anyone to say that this is less remarkable than what Newton has done, is to understand things in but a hollow and jejune way, 'tis like going to a Shakespeare play and remembering only the sword fights.

Daniel Waterhouse says to Hooke in Neal Stephenson's Quicksilver

Comment author: RolfAndreassen 06 May 2013 05:08:42PM 20 points [-]

But if the question is "Has this caused you to revise downward your estimate of the value of health insurance?" the answer has to obviously be yes. Anyone who answers differently is looking deep into their intestinal loops, not the Oregon study. You don't have to revise the estimate to zero, or even a low number. But if you'd asked folks before the results dropped what we'd expect to see if insurance made people a lot healthier, they'd have said "statistically significant improvement on basic markers for the most common chronic diseases. The fact that we didn't see that means that we should now say that health insurance, or at least Medicaid, probably doesn't make as big a difference in health as we thought.

-- Megan McArdle, trying to explain Bayesian updates and the importance of making predictions in advance, without referring to any mathematics.

Comment author: DanielLC 07 May 2013 04:17:28AM 6 points [-]

The value of health insurance isn't that it keeps you from getting sick. It's that it keeps you from getting in debt when you do get sick.

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 08 May 2013 03:26:52AM 0 points [-]

That's why McArdle recommended getting only catastrophic coverage.

Comment author: CCC 07 May 2013 07:55:54AM 0 points [-]

It does help you to pay for (say) blood-pressure medication. This might be expected to result in more people with medical aid and blood-pressure problems taking their medication.

It also helps to pay for doctors. This leads to more people going to the doctor with minor complaints, and increased chances of catching something serious earlier.

Comment author: RolfAndreassen 08 May 2013 05:52:12PM 3 points [-]

Er, yes, fine, but... to the extent that the study shows anything, it shows that the positive results of these effects, if they exist, are consistent with zero. Can we please discuss the data, now that we have some, and not theory?

Comment author: EHeller 07 May 2013 04:48:45AM 4 points [-]

This annoys me because she doesn't talk at all about the power of the study. Usually, when you see statistically insignificant positive changes across the board in a study without much power, its a suggestion you should hesitantly update a very tiny bit in the positive direction, AND you need another study, not a suggestion you should update downward.

When ethics prevent us from constructing high power statistical studies, we need to be a bit careful not to reify statistical significance.

Comment author: RolfAndreassen 07 May 2013 04:54:59PM 8 points [-]

If the effect is so small that a sample of several thousand is not sufficient to reliably observe it, then it doesn't even matter that it is positive. An analogy: Suppose I tell you that eating garlic daily increases your IQ, and point to a study with three million participants and P < 1e-7. Vastly significant, no? Now it turns out that the actual size of the effect is 0.01 points of IQ. Are you going to start eating garlic? What if it weren't garlic, but a several-billion-dollar government health program? Statistical significance is indeed not everything, but there's such a thing as considering the size of an effect, especially if there's a cost involved.

Moreover, please consider that "consistent with zero" means exactly that. If you throw a die ten times and it comes up heads six, do you "hesitantly update a very tiny bit" in the direction of the coin being biased? Would you do so, if you did not have a prior reason to hope that the coin was biased?

I respectfully suggest that you are letting your already-written bottom line interfere with your math.

Comment author: Luke_A_Somers 08 May 2013 04:33:35PM *  0 points [-]

Such a study might show that it doesn't matter on average. But you'd need those numbers to see if it's increasing the spread of values. That would mean that it really helps some and hurts others. If you can figure out which is which, then it'll end up being useful. Heck, this applies even if the average effect is negative.

I don't know how often bio-researchers treat the standard deviation as part of their signal. I suspect it's infrequent.

Comment author: RolfAndreassen 08 May 2013 05:30:33PM 0 points [-]

How large was your prior for "insurance helps some and harms others, and we should try to figure out which is which" before that was one possible way of rescuing insurance from this study? That sort of argument is, I respectfully suggest, a warning signal which should make you consider whether your bottom line is already written.

Comment author: Luke_A_Somers 09 May 2013 01:56:30AM *  1 point [-]

I wasn't even thinking of insurance here. You were talking about garlic. I was thinking about my physics experiments where the standard deviation is a very useful channel of information.

Comment author: satt 08 May 2013 11:31:52PM 5 points [-]

If the effect is so small that a sample of several thousand is not sufficient to reliably observe it, then it doesn't even matter that it is positive.

I strongly disagree.

An old comment of mine gives us a counterexample. A couple of years ago, a meta-analysis of RCTs found that taking aspirin daily reduces the risk of dying from cancer by ~20% in middle-aged and older adults. This is very much a practically significant effect, and it's probably an underestimate for reasons I'll omit for brevity — look at the paper if you're curious.

If you do look at the paper, notice figure 1, which summarizes the results of the 8 individual RCTs the meta-analysis used. Even though all of the RCTs had sample sizes in the thousands, 7 of them failed to show a statistically significant effect, including the 4 largest (sample sizes 5139, 5085, 3711 & 3310). The effect is therefore "so small that a sample of several thousand is not sufficient to reliably observe it", but we would be absolutely wrong to infer that "it doesn't even matter that it is positive"!

The heuristic that a hard-to-detect effect is probably too small to care about is a fair rule of thumb, but it's only a heuristic. EHeller & Unnamed are quite right to point out that statistical significance and practical significance correlate only imperfectly.

Comment author: wedrifid 01 February 2014 04:47:21AM 1 point [-]

A couple of years ago, a meta-analysis of RCTs found that taking aspirin daily reduces the risk of dying from cancer by ~20% in middle-aged and older adults.

That's a curious metric to choose. By that standard taking aspirin is about as healthy as playing a round of Russian Roulette.

Comment author: [deleted] 02 February 2014 10:18:02AM 1 point [-]

I'd assume they mean something like the per-year risk of dying from cancer conditional on previous survival -- if they indeed mean the total lifetime risk of dying from cancer I agree it's ridiculous.

Comment author: satt 01 February 2014 03:27:51PM 2 points [-]

That's a curious metric to choose.

It's a fairly natural metric to choose if one wishes to gauge aspirin's effect on cancer risk, as the study's authors did.

By that standard taking aspirin is about as healthy as playing a round of Russian Roulette.

Fortunately, the study's authors and I also interpreted the data by another standard. Daily aspirin reduced all-cause mortality, and didn't increase non-cancer deaths (except for "a transient increase in risk of vascular death in the aspirin groups during the first year after completion of the trials"). These are not results we would see if aspirin effected its anti-cancer magic by a similar mechanism to Russian Roulette.

Comment author: wedrifid 02 February 2014 09:53:31AM *  0 points [-]

It's a fairly natural metric to choose if one wishes to gauge aspirin's effect on cancer risk, as the study's authors did.

Pardon me. Mentioning only curiosity was politeness. The more significant meanings I would supplement with are 'naive or suspicious'. By itself that metric really is worthless and reading this kind of health claim should set off warning bells. Lost purposes are a big problem when it comes to medicine. Partly because it is hard, mostly because there is more money in the area than nearly anywhere else.

Fortunately, the study's authors and I also interpreted the data by another standard. Daily aspirin reduced all-cause mortality, and didn't increase non-cancer deaths (except for "a transient increase in risk of vascular death in the aspirin groups during the first year after completion of the trials").

And this is the reason low dose asprin is part of my daily supplement regime (while statins are not).

"All cause mortality" is a magical phrase.

Comment author: Alicorn 01 February 2014 06:42:47AM 1 point [-]

Am I missing a subtlety here, or is it just that cancer is usually one of those things that you hope to live long enough to get?

Comment author: gwern 01 February 2014 06:01:35PM 4 points [-]

Yeah, pretty much. There are other examples of this where something harmful appears to be helpful when you don't take into account possible selection biases (like being put into the 'non-cancer death' category); for example, this is an issue in smoking - you can find various correlations where smokers are healthier than non-smokers, but this is just because the unhealthier smokers got pushed over the edge by smoking and died earlier.

Comment author: gwern 01 February 2014 12:45:04AM *  2 points [-]

tl;dr: NHST and Bayesian-style subjective probability do not mix easily.

Another example of this problem: http://slatestarcodex.com/2014/01/25/beware-mass-produced-medical-recommendations/

Does vitamin D reduce all-cause mortality in the elderly? The point-estimates from pretty much all of the various studies are around a 5% reduction in risk of dying for any reason - pretty nontrivial, one would say, no? Yet the results are almost all not 'statistically significant'! So do we follow Rolf and say 'fans of vitamin D ought to update on vitamin D not helping overall'... or do we, applying power considerations about the likelihood of making the hard cutoffs at p<0.05 given the small sample sizes & plausible effect sizes, note that the point-estimates are in favor of the hypothesis? (And how does this interact with two-sided tests - vitamin D could've increased mortality, after all. Positive point-estimates are consistent with vitamin D helping, and less consistent with no effect, and even less consistent with it harming; so why are we supposed to update in favor of no help or harm when we see a positive point-estimate?)

If we accept Rolf's argument, then we'd be in the odd position of, as we read through one non-statistically-significant study after another, decreasing the probability of 'non-zero reduction in mortality'... right up until we get the Autier or Cochrane data summarizing the exact same studies & plug it into a Bayesian meta-analysis like Salvatier did & abruptly flip to '92% chance of non-zero reduction in mortality'.

Comment author: DSimon 08 May 2013 01:05:21AM 10 points [-]

If I throw a die and it comes up heads, I'd update in the direction of it being a very unusual die. :-)

Comment author: EHeller 08 May 2013 12:23:05AM *  4 points [-]

If the effect is so small that a sample of several thousand is not sufficient to reliably observe it, then it doesn't even matter that it is positive.

Have you read the study in question? The treatment sample is NOT several thousand, its about 1500. Further, the incidence of the diseases being looked at are only a few percent or less, so the treatment sample sizes for the most prevalent diseases are around 50 (also, if you look at the specifics of the sample, the diseased groups are pretty well controlled).

I suggest the following exercise- ask yourself what WOULD be a big effect, and then work through if the study has the power to see it.

Moreover, please consider that "consistent with zero" means exactly that.

Yes, but in this case, the sample sizes are small and the error bars are so large that consistent with zero is ALSO consistent with 25+ % reduction in incidence (which is a large intervention). The study is incapable from distinguishing hugely important effect from 0 effect, so we shouldn't update much at all, which is why I wished Mcardle had talked about statistical power. Before we ask "how should we update", we should ask "what information is actually here?"

Edit: If we treat this as an exploration, it says "we need another study"- after all the effects could be as large as 40%! Thats a potentially tremendous intervention. Unfortunately, its unethical to randomly boot people off of insurance so we'll likely never see that study done.

Comment author: Unnamed 07 May 2013 09:50:23PM 4 points [-]

If the effect is so small that a sample of several thousand is not sufficient to reliably observe it, then it doesn't even matter that it is positive. [...] Statistical significance is indeed not everything, but there's such a thing as considering the size of an effect, especially if there's a cost involved.

Health is extremely important - the statistical value of a human life is something like $8 million - so smallish looking effects can be practically relevant. An intervention that saves 1 life out of every 10,000 people treated has an average benefit of $800 per person. In this Oregon study, people who received Medicaid cost an extra $1,172 per year in total health spending, so the intervention would need to save 1.5 lives per 10,000 person-years (or provide an equivalent benefit in other health improvements) for the health benefits to balance out the health costs. The study looked at fewer than 10,000 people over 2 years, so the cost-benefit cutoff for whether it's worth it is less than 3 lives saved (or equivalent).

So "not statistically significant" does not imply unimportant, even with a sample size of several thousand. An effect at the cost-benefit threshold is unlikely to show up in significant changes to mortality rates. The intermediate health measures in this study are more sensitive to changes than mortality rate, but were they sensitive enough? Has anyone run the numbers on how sensitive they'd need to be in order to find an effect of this size? The point estimates that they did report are (relative to control group) an 8% reduction in number of people with elevated blood pressure, 17% reduction in number of people with high cholesterol, and 18% reduction in number of people with high glycated hemoglobin levels (a marker of diabetes), which intuitively seem big enough to be part of an across-the-board health improvement that passes cost-benefit muster.

Comment author: RolfAndreassen 07 May 2013 11:01:52PM 2 points [-]

which intuitively seem big enough to be part of an across-the-board health improvement that passes cost-benefit muster.

This would be much more convincing if you reported the costs along with the benefits, so that one could form some kind of estimate of what you're willing to pay for this. But, again, I think your argument is motivated. "Consistent with zero" means just that; it means that the study cannot exclude the possibility that the intervention was actively harmful, but they had a random fluctuation in the data.

I get the impression that people here talk a good game about statistics, but haven't really internalised the concept of error bars. I suggest that you have another look at why physics requires five sigma. There are really good reasons for that, you know; all the more so in a mindkilling-charged field.

Comment author: Unnamed 08 May 2013 12:13:33AM 3 points [-]

I was responding to the suggestion that, even if the effects that they found are real, they are too small to matter. To me, that line of reasoning is a cue to do a Fermi estimate to get a quantitative sense of how big the effect would need to be in order to matter, and how that compares to the empirical results.

I didn't get into a full-fledged Fermi estimate here (translating the measures that they used into the dollar value of the health benefits), which is hard to do that when they only collected data on a few intermediate health measures. (If anyone else has given it a shot, I'd like to take a look.) I did find a couple effect-size-related numbers for which I feel like I have some intuitive sense of their size, and they suggest that that line of reasoning does not go through. Effects that are big enough to matter relative to the costs of additional health spending (like 3 lives saved in their sample, or some equivalent benefit) seem small enough to avoid statistical significance, and the point estimates that they found which are not statistically significant (8-18% reductions in various metrics) seem large enough to matter.

My overall conclusion about the (based on what I know about it so far) study is that it provides little information for updating in any direction, because of those wide error bars. The results are consistent with Medicaid having no effect, they're consistent with Medicaid having a modest health benefit (e.g., 10% reduction in a few bad things), they're consistent with Medicaid being actively harmful, and they're consistent with Medicaid having a large benefit (e.g. 40% reduction in many bad things). The likelihood ratios that the data provide for distinguishing between those alternatives are fairly close to one, with "modest health benefit" slightly favored over the more extreme alternatives.

Comment author: RolfAndreassen 08 May 2013 05:39:15PM 3 points [-]

Again, the original point McArdle is making is that "consistent with zero" is just completely not what the proponents expected beforehand, and they should update accordingly. See my discussion with TheOtherDave, below. A small effect may, indeed, be worth pursuing. But here we have a case where something fairly costly was done after much disagreement, and the proponents claimed that there would be a large effect. In that case, if you find a small effect, you ought not to say "Well, it's still worth doing"; that's not what you said before. It was claimed that there would be a large effect, and the program was passed on this basis. It is then dishonest to turn around and say "Ok, the effect is small but still worthwhile". This ignores the inertia of political programs.

Comment author: Unnamed 09 May 2013 04:42:36AM 3 points [-]

Most Medicaid proponents did not have expectations about the statistical results of this particular study. They did not make predictions about confidence intervals and p values for these particular analyses. Rather, they had expectations about the actual benefit of Medicaid.

You cite Ezra Klein as someone who expected that Medicaid would drastically reduce mortality; Klein was drawing his numbers from a report which estimated that in the US "137,000 people died from 2000 through 2006 because they lacked health insurance, including 22,000 people in 2006." There were 47 million uninsured Americans in 2006, so those 22,000 excess deaths translate into 4.7 excess deaths per 10,000 uninsured people each year. So that's the size of the drastic reduction in mortality that you're referring to: 4.7 lives per 10,000 people each year. (For comparison, in my other comment I estimated that the Medicaid expansion would be worth its estimated cost if it saved at least 1.5 lives per 10,000 people each year or provided an equivalent benefit.)

Did the study rule out an effect as large as this drastic reduction of 4.7 per 10,000? As far as I can tell it did not (I'd like to see a more technical analysis of this). There were under 10,000 people in the study, so I wouldn't be surprised if they missed effects of that size. Their point estimates, of an 8-18% reduction in various bad things, intuitively seem like they could be consistent with an effect that size. And the upper bounds of their confidence intervals (a 40%+ reduction in each of the 3 bad things) intuitively seem consistent with a much larger effect. So if people like Klein and Drum had made predictions in advance about the effect size of the Oregon intervention, I suspect that their predictions would have fallen within the study's confidence interval.

There are presumably some people who did expect the results of the study to be statistically significant (otherwise, why run the study?), and they were wrong. But this isn't a competition between opponents and proponents where every slipup by one side cedes territory to the other side. The data and results are there for us to look at, so we can update based on what the study actually found instead of on which side of the conflict fought better in this battle. In this case, it looks like the correct update based on the study (for most people, to a first approximation) is to not update at all. The confidence interval for the effects that they examined covers the full range of results that seemed plausible beforehand (including the no-effect-whatsoever hypothesis and the tens-of-thousands-of-lives-each-year hypothesis), so the study provides little information for updating one's priors about the effectiveness of Medicaid.

For the people who did make the erroneous prediction that the study would find statistically significant results, why did they get it wrong? I'm not sure. A few possibilities: 1) they didn't do an analysis of the study's statistical power (or used some crude & mistaken heuristic to estimate power), 2) they overestimated how large a health benefit Medicaid would produce, 3) the control group in Oregon turned out to be healthier than they expected which left less room for Medicaid to show benefits, 4) fewer members of the experimental group than they expected ended up actually receiving Medicaid, which reduced the actual sample size and also added noise to the intent-to-treat analysis (reducing the effective sample size).

Comment author: Vaniver 08 May 2013 06:17:40PM *  2 points [-]

I do want to point out that, while I agree with your general points, I think that unless the proponents put numerical estimates up beforehand, it's not quite fair to assume they meant "it will be statistically significant in a sample size of N at least 95% of the time." Even if they said that, unless they explicitly calculated N, they probably underestimated it by at least one order of magnitude. (Professional researchers in social science make this mistake very frequently, and even when they avoid it, they can only very rarely find funding to actually collect N samples.)

I haven't looked into this study in depth, so semi-related anecdote time: there was recently a study of calorie restriction in monkeys which had ~70 monkeys. The confidence interval for the hazard ratio included 1 (no effect), and so they concluded no statistically significant benefit to CR on mortality, though they could declare statistically significant benefit on a few varieties of mortality and several health proxies.

I ran the numbers to determine the power; turns out that they couldn't have reliably noticed the effects of smoking (hazard ratio ~2) on longevity with a study of ~70 monkeys, and while I haven't seen many quoted estimates of the hazard ratio of eating normally compared to CR, I don't think there are many people that put them higher than 2.

When you don't have the power to reliably conclude that all-cause mortality decreased, you can eke out some extra information by looking at the signs of all the proxies you measured. If insurance does nothing, we should expect to see the effect estimates scattered around 0. If insurance has a positive effect, we should expect to see more effect estimates above 0 than below 0, even though most will include 0 in their CI. (Suppose they measure 30 mortality proxies, and all of them show a positive effect, though the univariate CI includes 0 for all of them. If the ground truth was no effect on mortality proxies, that's a very unlikely result to see; if the ground truth was a positive effect on mortality proxies, that's a likely result to see.)

Comment author: gwern 15 June 2013 03:34:25AM 1 point [-]

I ran the numbers to determine the power; turns out that they couldn't have reliably noticed the effects of smoking (hazard ratio ~2) on longevity with a study of ~70 monkeys, and while I haven't seen many quoted estimates of the hazard ratio of eating normally compared to CR, I don't think there are many people that put them higher than 2.

Incidentally, how did you do that?

Comment author: RolfAndreassen 08 May 2013 07:38:42PM 1 point [-]

It is of course very difficult to extract any precise numbers from a political discussion. :) However, if you click through some of the links in the article, or have a look at the followup from today, you'll find McArdle quoting predictions of tens of thousands of preventable deaths yearly from non-insured status. That looks to me like a pretty big hazard rate, no?

Comment author: satt 08 May 2013 10:34:10PM *  1 point [-]

you'll find McArdle quoting predictions of tens of thousands of preventable deaths yearly from non-insured status. That looks to me like a pretty big hazard rate, no?

No. The Oracle says there're about 50 million Americans without health insurance. The predictions you quoted refer to 18,000 or 27,000 deaths for want of insurance per year. The higher number implies only a 0.054% death rate per year, or a 3.5% death rate over 65 years (Americans over 65 automatically get insurance). This is non-negligible but hardly huge (and potentially important for all that).

Edit: and I see gwern has whupped me here.

Comment author: wedrifid 07 May 2013 06:12:32PM *  2 points [-]

If you throw a die ten times and it comes up heads six, do you "hesitantly update a very tiny bit" in the direction of the coin being biased?

If I throw a die once and it comes up heads I'm going to be confused. Now, assuming you meant "toss a coin and it comes up heads six times out of ten".

What is your intended 'correct' answer to the question? I think I would indeed hesitantly update a very (very) tiny bit in the direction of the coin being biased but different priors regarding the possibility of the coin being biased in various ways and degrees could easily make the update be towards not-biased. I'd significantly lower p(the coin is biased by having two heads) but very slightly raise p(the coin is slightly heavier on the tails side), etc.

Comment author: RolfAndreassen 07 May 2013 07:31:45PM 3 points [-]

My intended correct answer is that, on this data, you technically can adjust your belief very slightly; but because the prior for a biased coin is so tiny, the update is not worth doing. The calculation cost way exceeds any benefit you can get from gruel this thin. I would say "Null hypothesis [ie unbiased coin] not disconfirmed; move along, nothing to see here". And if you had a political reason for wishing the coin to be biased towards heads, then you should definitely not make any such update; because you certainly wouldn't have done so, if tails had come up six times. In that case it would immediately have been "P-level is in the double digits" and "no statistical significance means exactly that" and "with those errors we're still consistent with a heads bias".

Comment author: EHeller 08 May 2013 12:56:26AM 2 points [-]

My intended correct answer is that, on this data, you technically can adjust your belief very slightly; but because the prior for a biased coin is so tiny, the update is not worth do

I would think that our prior for "health care improves health" should be quite a bit larger than the prior for a coin to be biased.

Comment author: Jayson_Virissimo 08 May 2013 01:21:00AM 0 points [-]

That depends on how long "we" have been reading Overcoming Bias.

Comment author: EHeller 08 May 2013 03:56:54AM *  2 points [-]

Hanson's point is that we often over-treat to show we care- not that 0 health care is optimal. Medicaid patients don't really have to worry about overtreatment.

Comment author: Jayson_Virissimo 08 May 2013 04:49:25AM *  2 points [-]

Hanson's point is that we often over-treat to show we care- not that 0 health care is optimal

I was interpreting "health care improves health" as "healthcare improves health on the margin." Is this not what was meant?

Medicaid patients don't really have to worry about overtreatment.

As someone who has a start-up in the healthcare industry, this runs counter to my personal experience. Also, currently "medicaid overtreatment" is showing about 676,000 results on Google (while "medicaid undertreatment" is showing about 1,240,000 results). Even if it isn't typical, it surely isn't an unheard-of phenomenon.