The TDT-style reasoning is not "would this be bad if everyone did it?" but "would this be bad if everyone sufficiently similar to me did it?" and I think there it's much less clear. If everyone similar to me spent less time on politics and more time on more useful things I don't think that's obviously a net loss at all.
Also, again, I think influencing the majority to influence politicians is a reason to have political beliefs but that most people don't have political beliefs for this reason. A strategy for having political beliefs optimized for actually changing the opinions of large numbers of people would look very different from the way most people approach politics.
The TDT-style reasoning is not "would this be bad if everyone did it?" but "would this be bad if everyone sufficiently similar to me did it?" and I think there it's much less clear. If everyone similar to me spent less time on politics and more time on more useful things I don't think that's obviously a net loss at all.
To be slightly more precise, the TDT-style reasoning is, "Would this be bad if everyone who decided using a decision procedure logically correlated with mine did it?".
Now, it might be that your decision proce...
So you're playing the credence game, and you’re getting a pretty good sense of which level of confidence to assign to your beliefs. Later, when you’re discussing politics, you wonder how you can calibrate your political beliefs as well (beliefs of the form "policy X will result in outcome Y"). Here there's no easy way to assess whether a belief is true or false, in contrast to the trivia questions in the credence game. Moreover, it’s very easy to become mindkilled by politics. What do you do?
In the credence game, you get direct feedback that allows you to learn about your internal proxies for credence, i.e., emotional and heuristic cues about how much to trust yourself. With political beliefs, however, there is no such feedback. One workaround would be to assign high confidence only to beliefs for which you have read n academic papers on the subject. For example, only assign 90% confidence if you've read ten academic papers.
To account for mindkilling, use a second criterion: assign high confidence only to beliefs for which you are ideologically Turing-capable (i.e., able to pass an ideological Turing test). As a proxy for an actual ideological Turing test, you should be able to accurately restate your opponent’s position, or be able to state the strongest counterargument to your position.
In sum, to calibrate your political beliefs, only assign high confidence to beliefs which satisfy extremely demanding epistemic standards.