Mitchell_Porter comments on Earning to Give vs. Altruistic Career Choice Revisited - Less Wrong

34 Post author: JonahSinick 02 June 2013 02:55AM

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Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 31 May 2013 05:40:52PM 3 points [-]

Okay, so that's the Doomsday Argument then: Since being able to conquer the universe implies we're 10^70 special, we must not be able to conquer the universe.

Calling the converse of this an arcane meta-argument about probability hardly seems fair. You can make a case for Doomsday but it's not non-arcane.

Comment author: Mitchell_Porter 31 May 2013 09:53:06PM 1 point [-]

Perhaps this is hairsplitting but the principle I am employing is not arcane: it is that I should doubt theories which imply astronomically improbable things. The only unusual step is to realize that theories with vast future populations have such an implication.

I am unable to state what the SIA counterargument is.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 31 May 2013 10:22:13PM 2 points [-]

The only unusual step is to realize that theories with vast future populations have such an implication.

Right. That's arcane. Mundane theories have no need to measure the population of the universe.

Comment author: Mitchell_Porter 31 May 2013 10:44:23PM 1 point [-]

But it's still a simple idea once you grasp it. I was hoping you could state the counterargument with comparable simplicity. What is the counterargument at the level of principles, which neutralizes this one?

Comment author: Luke_A_Somers 02 June 2013 03:08:41PM 1 point [-]

In the theory that there are astronomically large numbers of people, it is a certainty that some of them came first. The probability that YOU are one of those people equal to the probability that YOU are any one of those other people. However, it does define a certain small narrow equivalence class that you happen to be a member of.

It's a bit like the difference between theorizing that: A) given that you bought a ticket, you'll win the lottery, and B) given that the lottery folks gave you a large sum, that you had the winning ticket.

Comment author: Mitchell_Porter 02 June 2013 10:48:54PM 0 points [-]

That's not the "SIA counterargument", which is what I want to hear (in a compact form, that makes it sound straightforward). You're just saying "accept the evidence that something ultra-improbable happened to you, because it had to happen to someone".

Comment author: Luke_A_Somers 03 June 2013 11:17:17AM 0 points [-]

I was only replying to the first paragraph, really. Even under the SSA there's no real problem here. I don't see how the SIA makes matters worse.