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ThisSpaceAvailable comments on Other prespective on resolving the Prisoner's dilemma - Less Wrong
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If the off-diagonals are impossible, then it's not the Prisoners' Dilemma, it's just Cake or Death. If you're facing an identical copy of yourself, then it's really the Newcomb Paradox. Open code (or, at least, unilateral open code) only works in the Ultimatum Game. One study found that knowing how the other person chose actually increases defection; the probability that Player Two defects given that Player One defects > probability given Player One cooperates > probability given Player One's action is unknown. Furthermore, open code only makes sense if you have a way of committing to following the code, and part of the Prisoners' Dilemma is that there is no way for either player to commit to a course of action. And another part of the whole concept of the one-off Prisoners' dilemma is that there is no way to retaliate. If the players can sue each other for reneging on agreements, then it's basically an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma (and if there's a defined endpoint, then you have the Backwards Induction Paradox).
Yes; the goal is to replace the PD with Cake or Death, in which case Cake is chosen. Various strategies are available that do this in various situations, and all involve modifying the game or incentive structure.
The easiest way to turn unilateral open code into bilateral open code is for your code to be "defect against people who have not given you their decision-making source code, and cooperate with those who post open code that cooperates with this program".